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Chauncey Wright 235 would not otherwise have come to light, — the existence of the planet Neptune, for instance. If the philosopher wishes to be scientific, let him discipline himself by carrying on an original investigation in some department of empirical science so as to gain a clear idea how knowledge is actually used as a basis for discovering new truths. Anticipating the instrumentaUsm of Dewey, as well as the pragmatism of James, Wright points out that the principles of modem mathematical and physical phi- losophy are rather the eyes with which nature is seen than the elements and constitution of the object discovered, that general laws are finders, not merely summaries of truth. Wright does not underestimate the value of religious or metaphysical philosophies, though they may be full of vague ideas, crude fancies, and unverified convictions; for they "con- stitute more of human happiness and human wealth than the nar- row material standards of science have been able to measure." But scientific philosophy must be clearly distinguished from these. The motives of science arise in rational curiosity or wonder, while religious and metaphysical philosophies arise from the desire — not to discover new truths but — to defend our emotional and vital preferences by exhibiting them as entirely free from inconsistency. Logical refutation of every opposing philosophy affords us satisfaction but does not convince our opponents; because the choice of ultimate metaphysical dog- mas is a matter of character (or temperament, as James later said) and not of logic. Wright's own choice, which he does not pretend to demon- strate, is for the view attributed to Aristotle, that creation is not a progression toward a single end, but rather an endless succession of changes, simple and constant in their elements, though infinite in their combinations, which constitute an order without beginning and without termination. This distinction between elements and their combination enabled him to unite the belief in the universaUty of physical causation which is the scientist's protection against the refined superstitions of teleo- logy with the Aristotelian belief in accidents which keeps the scientist from erecting his discoveries into metaphysical dogmas. Scientific research must postulate the universality of the causal relation between elementary facts and cannot make use of any teleology, since there is no scientific test for distinguishing