say, is the really dreadful form, — Professor Royce’s explanation (which, by the way, is the same as that given in the last chapter of my book entitled Evolution and Religions Thought) is, I believe, the true one. It is, that the existence or at least the possibility of what we call Evil is the necessary condition of a moral being like that of man. There are some things which God himself cannot do, viz., such things as are contrary to his essential nature, and such things as are a contradiction in terms and therefore absurd and unthinkable. Such a thing would be a moral being without freedom to choose right or wrong. God could not make man eternally and of necessity sinless, for then he would not be man at all. To make him incapable of sin would be to make him also incapable of virtue, of righteousness, of holiness; for he must acquire these for himself by free choice, by struggle and conquest. Professor Royce brings this out admirably; but it seems to me this view is singularly emphasised by the evolutional account of the origin of man. For if humanity gradually emerged out of animality, then it is evident that man’s higher nature — his distinctive humanity — was at first very feeble, and that the whole mission of man is the progressive conquest of the animal by the distinctively human nature. It has been a long and hard struggle, and even yet, as we all know and feel, is far from complete.
As already said, then, I believe Professor Royce gives a true answer so far as moral evil is concerned, although he misses the emphasis which evolution gives that view. But other evil — physical evil — he
