actually posited and possibly positable by this procedure is, indeed, the Unconditioned Conditioner with reference to a possible experience, but is unwittingly miscalled when called the Unknowable, for it is in precise fact just the Self-knowing Knower, — the comprehensive and active Supreme Judgment in whose light alone the things of experience are as they are; since they are, as they are, only as they are presented at its bar and there get ever more and more known.
But now I ask you to notice, next, how this argument, unanswerable as it is for displacing the phantom of the Unknowable and discovering the Idealism concealed in the philosophy that calls itself Agnosticism, nevertheless leaves us unrescued from an Idealism still merely subjective, though subjective in another and a somewhat higher sense. I mean, that the argument, taken strictly in itself, supplies no reason for reading off the resulting Reality from the point of view of its infinite inclusiveness, its supposed universal Publicity, rather than from that of its finite exclusiveness, its undeniable particular Privacy. Here I agree, as I have already once indicated, with the brunt of the first criticism made by Professor Mezes, and with his ground for the criticism: the argument of Professor Royce is so cast and based that no provision is made for a public of thinkers. In terms of this form of Idealism, no manifold of selves is provided for or can be provided for; and this I would conclude, not only as Professor Mezes does, from the limited scope assigned by Monistic Idealism to the illative principle of Causality, but also from the in-
