so to develope Idealism that it may include the truth both of ordinary Realism and of the ethical interpretation of reality.
I
THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF REALITY
One sees, hears, touches, — in general, one experiences, — “the real world.” One thinks of the “real,” is subject to the laws of the real, is in fact constantly in a compulsory bondage to this reality. This is the “fact,” the “simple fact,” upon which, again and again, popular forms of Realism base themselves. If you ask: But what means this word “reality,” as applied to characterise what one sees, hears, touches, thinks about, and finds oneself compelled to submit to? the answer comes: “Reality connotes independence of the experience and thought and will of the being who deals as we do with the real.” Thus, that I know, feel, and am bound by, the presence of reality, is a fact in me, a modification of my experience, of my thought, and of my will. But that the real is, this is something independent of me, and this fact is there whether I know it or not, whether I think so or not, whether I want it or not. What thus compels me, is beyond me and independent of me. What is my object, needs, as such, not at all the plastic and submissive presence of me as subject.[1] As subject, I am, to be
- ↑ Sigwart, Logik, 2d ed., I, 90: “Was ‘ist,’ das ist nicht bloss von meiner Denkthätigkeit erzeugt, sondern unabhängig von derselben, bleibt dasselbe, ob ich es im Augenblick vorstelle oder nicht.” Id., I, 44: “Der Satz: Kein Objekt ohne Subjekt, ist im demselben Sinne wie der Satz: Ein Reiter kann nicht zu Fuss gehn.” These are typical expressions of realistic presuppositions, taken from a representative modern book.
