Page:The Conception of God (1897).djvu/190

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SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY BY PROFESSOR ROYCE
153

The existence of the object, when it is not felt, is ipso facto something not felt. This existence, as for argument’s sake we may momentarily admit, may indeed be “known,” that is, it may be believed in, from the start, it may be accepted as a “postulate,” it may be concluded from signs, from intuitions, from reasonings long or brief; but, in any case, it cannot be a matter of merely immediate knowledge. For immediate knowledge, if it means anything, means knowledge of what is present in feeling.

One turns, then, to the other forms of Realism. Consciousness somehow, although not in a merely immediate way, bears witness to the presence of a transcendent object, which is independent of all consciousness. But, once more. How?

Amongst the numerous answers to this question attempted by philosophical realists, there are three which here especially concern us. They form the genuine basis of the more reflective sorts of Realism; and together they actually express a truth.


III
THE FIRST ARGUMENT FOR REALISM

The first of these three answers runs: The data of our experience, and in fact of all consciousness, viewed just as the data of consciousness, present themselves in such form as to call for explanation. The explanation called for cannot be furnished by other data of consciousness; for these, again, being such data, would themselves require explanation.