Page:The Conception of God (1897).djvu/310

self-conscious being, is for him the object of his exclusive interest; an object for which, in his eyes, no other could be substituted so long as he remains himself. He is unique, moreover, in that no other fulfilment of his ideal than his own attainment of that goal could meet his exclusive interest, so that no other self than himself could in such wise attain that goal as to fulfil his interest therein. He is self-conscious by virtue of his knowing his interest in his ideal as such an exclusive interest, and as the central interest of his moral personality. He has an ideal, because only in so far as he has an ideal is he a person at all. And now I shall also maintain: (3) There is no conflict between the first and the second of the foregoing theses, so that the uniqueness of the Absolute Individual, his inclusive unity, his freedom, his self-possession, hinders in no whit the included variety, the relative freedom, the relative separateness, of the finite moral individuals, who, in their own grade of reality, are as independent of one another, in their freedom of choice, but also as dependent upon one another, in the interlinked contents of their lives, as the moral order requires. They are not, like the Absolute, whole individuals, for each, as Professor Howison expressly admits, needs all the others. But the freedom of each finite moral individual is part of the Divine freedom, — not an absolutely separate part, but a part having its own relative freedom, — a differentiated element of this freedom itself. The uniqueness of each moral individual is a part of that which renders the Divine life, in its wholeness, unique. The self-consciousness of each finite individual is a portion