point out how the unity of the eternal world is related to the significant temporal events of the moral world. Professor Mezes is, however, perfectly right in declaring that both the foregoing questions: What finite beings exist? and, What is the relation of the moral world to the Absolute? are questions of great importance for philosophy. He is right in observing that, since my discussion omitted the definite consideration of these problems, it is inadequate. I need make here only the general plea, in “avoidance,” that I did not profess that my discussion was adequate.
As to the particulars, however, of Professor Mezes’s objections, I have indeed a few observations to offer. Professor Mezes, in the first of his two general comments, expresses some curiosity as to how I should undertake to supplement my conception, so far as concerns the wealth and the “spirituality” of the Absolute Life. Whence, he asks, can I derive, on the basis of my argument, the more “spiritual” attributes of my Absolute? My natural reply is a question addressed to Professor Mezes: Whence does he himself derive the conception of the “spirituality” whose presence he misses from the conception of the Absolute so far as I have defined it? For him to answer my question will inevitably involve the answer to his own. One has somehow or other formed, upon the basis of one’s finite experience, thought, reflection, and will, an idea of types of life that are higher in the scale of spirituality than are other types of life. In consequence, one avers that the single finite individual is, as such, of less import
