opposed to mere seeming, assert of necessity, as has just been shown, that if there were an organised unity of experience, this organised experience would have present to it as part of its content the fact whose reality we assert. This proposition cannot, as a merely hypothetical proposition, have any real truth unless to its asserted possibility there corresponds some actual experience, present somewhere in the world, not of barely possible, but of concretely actual experience. And this is the first of our two considerations. In fine, if there is an actual experience to which an absolute reality corresponds, then you can indeed translate this actuality into the terms of bare possibility. But unless there is such an actual experience, the bare possibility expresses no truth.
The second consideration appears when we ask our finite experience whereabouts, in its limited circle, is in any wise even suggested the actually experienced fact of which that hypothetical proposition relating to the ideal or absolute experience is the expression. What in finite experience suggests the truth that if there were an absolute experience it would find a certain unity of facts?
VII
PROOF OF THE REALITY OF AN ABSOLUTE EXPERIENCE
To the foregoing question, my answer is this: Any finite experience either regards itself as suggesting some sort of truth, or does not so regard itself. If
