Meno.
Socrates, Meno.
The desire of good is really common to all of them.
Soc. But if this be affirmed, thien the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that soceates, respect?
Men. True.
Soc. And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?
Men. Exactly.
Virtue is the power of attaining good with justice. Soc. Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?
Men. I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which good with you now view this matter.
Soc. Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right:—You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the state—those are what you would call goods?
Men. Yes, I should include all those.
Soc. Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust or dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
Men. Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.
Soc. Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.
Men. Why, how can there be virtue without these?
Soc. And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally virtue?
Men. True.
Soc. Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever 79 is devoid of justice is vice.
