This force was not sent to punish the Indians, but to "inquire into" the cause of Kamiakin's hostility; and General Wool, in May following, in a letter to the National Intelligencer, charged Haller with "proceeding on his mission without the precautions necessary against savage warfare,"—certainly a contradiction of terms. Just as certainly Haller did not expect so soon to find the Yakimas prepared for battle; while, on the other hand, the civil authorities of Oregon and Washington felt great anxiety for the fate of the expedition, as, should it fail, a long war might be apprehended.
About sixty miles from The Dalles, which post he had left on the second of October, just as his command was emerging from a deep ravine on Pisco river, Haller found himself confronted on the afternoon of the sixth by fifteen hundred Indians, who attacked him. The battle continued until night, when he gained possession of a hill, where he remained surrounded; the battle being renewed on the morning of the seventh, and lasting all that day, the troops being without water, and with little food. During the second night a courier was dispatched to The Dalles for reënforcements, and to apprise Major Rains of the situation of Haller's command.
Towards evening of the third day, the suffering from thirst being unbearable, the cavalry horses and pack animals were allowed to go free to find water and grass, only as many horses as were necessary to move the wounded and the ammunition being retained. Preparations were also made to retreat towards The Dalles; the howitzer being spiked and buried, and the baggage and provisions burned. The command was organized in two divisions, the advance under Haller with the wounded, and the rear under Captain Russell, acting as guard. With characteristic indetermination, the Indians had withdrawn to a sufficient distance to allow of such a movement; and but for the guide in the darkness having led the advance off the trail, so that fires had to be lighted to signal the rear
