verdict. No one blames the latter, nor ought any to blame the former.
Many persons would admit that this is, in theory, a sufficient justification of the profession of advocacy, but they would add: "Whatever may be the theory, the practice is, in point of fact, unjustifiable: Lawyers do not, as a rule, confine themselves to performing the duty which the law assigns them. They do twist evidence; they do, as far as they can, pervert and obscure the truth, and their standing and success in their profession is determined by the ability with which they contrive to do so."
This impression is as unjust as it is common. Its injustice is displayed most strikingly in the fact that it entirely overlooks the existence of a whole system of professional morality based upon the principles just stated, and rigidly enforced, not only by the authority of the judges, but by both the good and bad qualities of the bar, by professional honor and esprit de corps on the one hand, and by personal rivalry and even jealousy on the other. It would be out of place here to enter upon a full description of this system, but it may be stated generally that its object is to maintain rigidly the representative character of the advocate. It forbids every expression and every form, either of statement or of interrogation, which would involve a surrender of that character and make the advocate a partisan, instead of a professional agent. To attack private character without explicit instructions that the imputations made are true; to misstate the effect of evidence; to put to a jury a false view of the law; to attempt to mislead the court by garbling or misquoting cases; to insult or attempt to confuse and bewilder a witness by a brutal manner or insolent questions,—are practices which are looked upon by the legal profession in the light in which tradesmen look upon sanding sugar and wetting tobacco; and they would, as a rule, be resorted to only by a low, disreputable class of lawyers.
The general character of litigation is in itself a proof that it cannot be advantageously conducted by dishonest men. It is one of the foolish errors into which people are led by the wish to appear knowing, to assert that litigation is generally dishonest. In fact, it is an uncommon thing for people to go to law unless, whether right or wrong, they have a substantial reason for doing so. Of the many foolish things that are said about the bar, few are more foolish than the common assertion that moral vices, such as impudence, coarseness, and lying, are useful to a lawyer. In fact, honesty is the best policy in that in precisely the same sense as in other professions. Each of the three vices named is, on the whole, injurious to a man's legal prospects. Impudence is often confounded with the possession of strong nerves,—the advantage of which no one disputes; but it is in reality quite a different thing. It is no more than insensibility to shame, arising from the absence of that internal warning which holds a man back from doing what is wrong, or makes him feel ashamed of himself if he does; but how is this an advantage to any one? It can only be one on the supposition that to do the shameful thing which modesty withholds a man from doing is an advantage. Impudence is very like imperfect bodily senses,—it consists not in an excess of courage, but in want of sensibility, and is a most serious defect both in speaking and in the examination of witnesses. It is impossible to do either of these things well unless the speaker can establish sympathy between himself and those whom he is addressing, and to do this considerable sensibility is indispensable. An impudent man does not feel whether the judge and jury are listening to him or not, nor has he any notion of the impression he is making. He cannot feel for the witness whom he examines, and therefore never examines him well, for he does not see how his questions affect him. The same may be said to a great extent of coarseness, which has, moreover, the additional disadvantage of disgusting those who listen to it.
