technicality in the administration of the funds of the estate, the situation of the remaining members of the family dependent upon the stranger or corporation for their very exis tence often becomes very awkward and em barrassing- to say the least. With the widow or some other member of the family acting as executrix or administratrix without bond, these and many other disagreeable and ex pensive features of the administration of estates by strangers or trust companies are avoided and the family affairs move on after the deatlr of the decedent without interrup tion or annoyance. Our conclusion is therefore that the pro fession should as often as opportunity pre sents, enlighten the public mind on the dis advantages and embarrassments that arise when trust companies are appointed to act as executors or guardians. Whether it would be wise to seek legislative interference in this regard, as some attorneys have suggested, is to be gravely doubted. The motives of the profession would certainly be misconstrued and misunderstood. But it is certainly ad visable, also, in drawing a will for a client, to point out the respective advantages of having a trust company to administer any trust which the testator may create by his will as well as that of having the widow or some other member of the family appointed to carry the estate through the period of administration.
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Burdick, "is stated by Metcalf, J., as follows: 'He to whom property is sold with express warranty, as well as he to whom property is sold with implied warranty, may rescind the contract for breach of warranty, by a season able return of the property, and thus entitle himself to a full defense to a suit brought against him for the price of the property, or to an action against the seller to recover back the price, if it has been paid to him.'" . . . Does a breach of warranty, using the term in the narrow sense of a promise collat eral or subsidiary to the main purpose of the sale contract, give to the buyer the right to revest title and possession in the seller with out the latter's consent? The Massachusetts rule answers the question in the affirmative. The English law answers it in the negative. After examining the cases cited as follow ing the Massachusetts rule, Professor Bur dick sums up as follows: The result of this re-examination of the cited cases is this: In but two jurisdictions (Iowa and Maine) have the courts unequivo cally adopted the Massachusetts rule. Even if we suppose that the habit of repeating as a dictum the terms of that rule has become so inveterate in Alabama. Missouri and Wis consin, as to justify the belief that the courts of those States will follow it, when the ques tion is squarely presented, we have but five jurisdictions following the lead of Massa chusetts. On the other hand, the learned writer of the article in question enumerates sixteen jurisdictions which have followed the English rule. To these should be added, as we have seen, California and North Dakota, and also Hawaii. When we bear in mind that the doctrine of the United States Supreme Court is controlling in every Federal tribunal of the nation, in the absence of local statutes, the preponderance of American authority against the Massachusetts rule is simply overwhelming.
PROFFSSOR FRANCIS M. BURDICK. of the Co lumbia Law School, in a scholarly article en titled "Recission for Breach of Warranty," in the Columbia Law Review for January, takes issue with a recent statement by Pro fessor Samuel Williston, of the Harvard Law School, that "though the text writers have not generally recognized the fact, nearly as many courts have followed the Massachu setts rule as have followed the English law;" cases from Alabama, California, Iowa, Louis IN his second article on "The Expansion iana, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, and Wisconsin, being! of the Common Law," (Columbia Law Re! view, January) Sir Frederick Pollock, in his cited in support of this assertion. ' "The Massachusetts rule," says Professor usual scholarly and interesting way, traces
