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NOTES OF RECENT CASES OF IMPORTANCE^ FROM THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM. (Copies of the pamphlet Reporters containing full reports of any of these decisions may be secured from the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, at 25 cents each. In ordering, the title of the desired case should be given as well as the citation of volume and page of the Reporter in which it is printed.)

PUBLIC POLICY. (ILLEGAL CONTRACT—PARTNER SHIP—CAMPAIGN EXPENSES OF PARTNER.) MISSOURI SUPRF.ME^COURT.

In Ward v. Hartley, 77 Southwestern 302, the court had before it the validity of a con tract between members of a partnership, that the firm should bear the election expenses of one member, who was a candidate for president of the city council. The partners were engaged in the trade of bricklaying and building, and they undertook large contracts, the largest of which were for public works. They were competitors in the market with other concerns for like work. In holding that the contract was void as contrary to public policy, the court says it may be true that the mere eclat which the parties sup posed would reflect on the firm by the eleva tion of one of its members to a high office in the city government is all that was con templated, and it may be that they estimated that distinction as being worth the money they agreed to pay for it, just as many firms indulge in other forms of advertisement. But beyond that, no consideration is perceived for the agreement. The firm could derive no legal advantage from the fact that one of its members was president of the council, and if he had been elected and had faithfully per formed his duty the firm would have derived no illegal advantage from his position. Therefore the motive did not sufficiently ap pear to justify the court in holding- that the contract was supported by a legal consider ation. The only theory on which direct ad vantage to the firm could be expected is that the partner, if he had been elected, would have used his official influence to favor his firm over others in like business. This, of course, would be liable to result in detriment to the public service, and would be contrary to public policy.

WITNESS. (CALLING BY COURT— BINDING CHAR ACTER OK TESTIMONY—VIOLATION OF LOCAL OPTION LAW.) TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS.

In Goldwater v. State, 77 Southwestern Reporter 221, defendant was prosecuted for violating the local option law. The case was tried by the court without a jury. One wit ness had given evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, when the court of its own mo tion called another witness, who contradicted the first, and whose testimony tended to dis prove any violation of law. It was con tended that the court, having called this last witness, was bound by his testimony and thereby precluded from convicting. This, it is held orí appeal, is not true. His testimony was before the court as that of any other witness, and the court, like a jury, was authorized to believe either witness, and if the testimony of the first was sufficient to sustain a verdict, the conviction must stand. ACCIDENT INSURANCE. (EXCKPTKD CAUSESTHINGS TAKKN INTERNALLY—SPOILED OYSTERS.) TEXAS SUPREME COURT.

In Maryland Casualty Company v. Hudgins, 76 Southwestern Reporter 745, the clause in an accident insurance policy pro viding that the insurance shall not cover in juries "resulting from poison or anything ac cidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed or inhaled, but it is understood that this policy covers injury from choking in swallowing, is construed and held to relieve the company from liability for death occa sioned by ptomaine poisoning following the eating of some unsound oysters. The court says that the word "take" means to eat as food, for which definition Webster's diction ary is cited, and that this is particularly true in view of the qualifying clause as to