hundred and fifty to three hundred tons ca pacity were used on the canal as late as 1850, and while these 'boats were vessels of light draught and were drawn by animal power, they were larger than those out of which arose the maritime law of modern Europe, and much larger than those employed by Columbus in his discovery of America. In fact neither size, form, equipment nor means of propulsion are determinative factors upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only the purpose for which the craft was con structed and the business in which it is en gaged. As to the argument that boats on the Erie Canal are drawn by horses, that is said to appeal less to the reason than to the imagination. Boats on their arrival in Al bany are relieved of their horses and taken by steamer to New York. To hold that such boats are not within the admiralty jurisdiction while going down the Hudson River, would require the overruling of a large num ber of cases, while it would seem like "stick ing in the bark" to hold that a canal boat might recover for a collision while in tow of a tug, but might not recover while in tow of a horse. In the third place it was argued that as the repairs to the boat in question were made in dry dock they were made upon land. This the court is unwilling to admit. A dock is an artificial basin in connection with a har bor, and a dry dock differs from an ordinary dock only in the fact that it is smaller and is provided with machinery for pumping out water in order that the vessel may be re paired. All injuries below the water line must necessarily be repaired in dry clock, but it has never before been supposed that such repairs were made on land. No authorities were cited on the proposition and the court believes that none exist. The fact that the boat was employed wholly in commerce within the State of New York was held to make no difference, the ruling case cited being The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. Ed. 266. Finally the remedy pro vided by the New York statute is examined and its character determined to be that of a
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proceeding in rem, and therefore distinctive ly a remedy of admiralty. In a lengthy dissenting opinion concurred in by -Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Peckham, Justice Brewer holds that the con tract was made on land, for work to be done on land, which was in fact performed on land, and was therefore not a maritime contract; that the proceeding which was instituted was in its essential features an ordinary proceed ing according to the course of the common law, which may always be resorted to, even in respect to contracts which are of a strictly maritime nature; and that the grant to the national government over admiralty and maritime matters does not extend to con tracts made in respect to vessels which are incapacitated from commerce and are de signed and used exclusively for local traffic within a State. Mr. Justice Harían also dissents. The case marks a very interesting exten sion of Federal jurisdiction and recalls the singular prophecy of Horatio Seymour made during his campaign for the presidency in 1868, that those in his audience might yet live to see the day when the Federal judic iary (of whose power he was jealous) would extend its sway over the Erie Canal. BLOOD HOUNDS. (FOLLOWING TRAIL—EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.) NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT..
George W. Brott was convicted of bur glary. The opinion reversing this judgment is found in 97 Northwestern Reporter, page 593. The crucial point in the case was the admissibility of the evidence of the con duct of blood hounds in following the trail of the burglar from the scene of the crime to defendant's residence.0 The court holds' that the evidence was improperly admitted. It says there is a prevalent belief that ih the pursuit and discovery of fugitive criminals the blood hound is practically infallible; that it is a commonly accepted notion that he will start from a place where a crime has been committed, follow the track" for miles upon which he has been set, find the culprit, con:
