Certain differences of opinion exist as to the effect of contraband on the vessel carry ing it. The penalty attaching to the goods is not in general extended to the ship, and some writers even consider that the neutral vessel has a right to continue on her voyage on her abandoning the contraband she is carrying to the belligerent, unless their quantity is so great that the captor cannot receive them. And this practice was followed by the Confederate States during the Ameri can Civil War, though in the opinion of Wheaton it could only be applied to cases in which there is a capacity in the neutral vessel to insure the captor against a claim to the goods. But, under the more common prac tice, the vessel with its contraband cargo is taken into a port of the captor, where the contraband articles are dealt with either by confiscation or preemption, the vessel itself in ordinary cases being subjected to no further penalty than loss of time, freight and expenses. If, how-ever, the owner of the ship is a party or privy to the carriage of the contraband goods, the ship itself is dealt with in a similar manner to the cargo. The Canada Law Journal for February ad vocates the "Territorial Expansion of Can ada"—particularly "the acquisition of the two islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon"— and adds: There is this further argument in favor of the acquisition of these several portions of contiguous territory by Canada, namely, that by no reasonable extension of the Mon roe doctrine can the Government of the United States object to any part of the pro ceeding. It is true that President Folk's gloss upon the now famous doctrine enun ciated by his predecessor Monroe, at the suggestion of the English statesman Can ning, has been interpreted to mean that any European power would have to obtain the consent of the United States to any acquisi tion of dominion in the Americas whether by voluntary cession, or transfer, or by con quest (see Dana's notes to IVheaton's Ele ments, p. 102; Taylor's International Laiv, p. 146.) But Canada does not come within the
letter or spirit of this inhibition, and the burden that might rest upon Great Britain, were she purchasing sua causa, of establish ing that this inhibition is no part of the code of international law, or that Great Britain is herself an American power and so not within the inhibition even if it were valid, would not be raised in the matter of terri torial expansion here advocated. The Harvard Lan.1 Review for February contains the second of Professor Bruce Wyman's important papers on "The Law of Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem." What is contended (says Professor Wyman) is that this distinction between the pulic calling and the private calling is the key to the situation. . . . All of these cases now under discussion are alike in this, that in all of them the con ditions surrounding the industry, and these alone, are held enough to put the business within the law of public calling. That posi tion of affairs may be summed up in a single phrase—virtual monopoly. A review of the instances which have been cited in the course of this discussion will show that this con ception of virtual monopoly will cover every thing. Nothing narrower will do, as for ex ample the difference sometimes made be tween the undertaking of a public service anrl the furnishing of a public supply. Now, it is true that most of the cases are cases of serv ice—the railway and the warehouse, for ex ample; but others of the cases are of supply, —the waterworks and gas works, for in stance. Indeed, there is nothing in this dis tinction, either in economics or in law. Vir tual monopoly is therefore the exact descrip tion of the situation. It is submitted that any business is made out to be a public calling in which there is, from the nature of things, an inherent virtual monopoly. Virtual monopoly must now be differen tiated from virtual competition. It is sub mitted that upon this difference our consti tutional law turns. If virtual monopoly is made out as the permanent condition of af fairs in a given business, then the law, it
