A VALUABLE study of "Constitutional Pro visions Guaranteeing Freedom of the Press in Pennsylvania" is contributed by Thomas Raeburn White to the January number of the American Law Register. There is (he says) some difference of opin ion as to how far liability for spoken or writ ten words can be altered by the Legislature. On the one hand, it may be said that freedom to publish being guaranteed, the Constitu tion does not extend its protection further, and everyone runs the risk of being held re sponsible for his words, whether that responsibilty is imposed by the common law or by legislative action; that the Constitution does not concern itself with what happens after the matter has been given to the public. In other words, the publisher lias full liberty to publish what he pleases, but let him see to it that he does not transgress the law, written or unwritten. Another view of this matter is possible, and has obtained some recognition, viz., that the Constitution not only gives permis sion to publish, but guarantees immunity from liability for such words as at common law were non-libelous. It is said that "free dom of the press" would mean nothing if the Legislature, while not able to restrain the printing, could pass laws which would inflict severe penalties for the publication of words which, judged by the standard of the common law, were innocent. The difference between the two views is that under the former the Legislature can create new civil or criminal liability for spoken or written words, where as, under the latter, its hands are tied; it can not increase the common law responsibility. This conception of the meaning of the free dom of the press was advanced by Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, ch. 12. It has never been the basis of a judicial decision, as no law raising the point has had its validity questioned on that ground. And in a note is added this interesting comment on the recent Pennsylvania "gaglaw": The Pennsylvania libel act of May 12, 1903, P. L., 349, may be attacked upon this ground, and if so there may be a judicial de
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termination of this important question. By the terms of that act civil liability is created in a class of cases in which at common law there was no liability. It is provided that the publishers of newspapers shall be civilly responsible in damages for all publications made without a careful investigation into facts. In other words, the test of liability in all cases is negligence. This means that where the words have been spoken upon a privileged occasion, the plaintiff to succeed need not (as he must at common law) prove actual malice on the part of the defendant, but that it is sufficient if he prove negligence only. It is true that recklessness in publish ing may be evidence of malice, but it is not malice fin Briggs z'. Garrett, in Pa. 404, mere failure to investigate was held no evi dence of malice); hence the new act creates liability in a class of cases in which, at com mon law, there was no liability. If Cooler's view should be adopted, the act may be de clared void, as being contrary to the consti tutional provisions under discussion. IN the Michigan Lau.' /?<viVii' for February is printed a paper given by Dean Gregory of the College of Law of the State Univer sity of Iowa, before the International Law Association at Antwerp last September, on "Jurisdiction Over Foreign Ships in Terri torial Waters." The question is considere:!, first, as to government ships, and then in re lation to private ships. The result of the au thorities is summed up as follows : 1. That a foreign government ship in ter ritorial waters is not exactly extraterri torial," but simply "inviolable by local au thority, that the extraterritoriality applies only to her foreign crew and equipments, and this only by general comity. 2. That, her inviolability continues only while she is "demeaning herself in a friendly manner." 3. That, as to vessels belonging to pri vate owners in foreign territorial waters, jurisdiction attaches whether those waters are enclosed or littoral, very much at the dis cretion of the local State, but with a constant practice in local authorities to refuse juris
