IN The Law Magazine and Review for Feb ruary Gustav Shirrmeister, Doctor of Rom an and Canon Law (Berlin and Leipzig) has an interesting article on "Legal Education in Germany." He says: The necessary qualifications for a call to the Bar is attained in Germany by passing two legal examinations. The first one must be preceded by at least a three years' course in law at a University. Between the first and the second examination there must be a period of four years, which is to be spent in practical service, partly at the different Courts of Justice, partly in the chambers of practising advocates ("Rcchtsanwaclte"), and partly in the chambers of a public prosecutor ("Staatsanwalt"). After giving the list of lectures on both law and political science which must be at tended by a German law student, and the programs prescribed by the Universities of Göttingen and Münster, the article contin ues: As it is very difficult for the average stud ent to finish the required course of study in the short space of three years, the authori ties of all German Universities recommend that the law 'student devote four years to the study of law before he tries to pass the first legal examination. Indeed, the law student will usually find it necessary to spend four years at the University in order to finish the prescribed course. The result is that the required academic study in law extends practically over four years in Germanv. THEKE is much interesting matter in Sir Frederick Pollock's third article on the Expansion of the Common Law"—"The Sword of Justice"—in the February number of the Columbia Lam Review. Of the jury Sir Frederick says: On the whole the jury triumphed in crim inal, as well as in civil justice. But until the sixteenth century the process was gradual and inconspicuous, and some of the most important matters were settled, as it were, by accident. We can now see that if the
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verdict of a majority had been accepted, the resistance of juries to the Crown in later times would have been, perhaps, impossible, certainly much less effective. The rule was not fixed before the fourteenth century, and I do not think it was everjaid down in terms that juries must be unanimous. It is true that the dooms of the ancient popular courts had in some countries, if not in England, tobe unanimous; but the jury has nothing to do with the ancient folk-law. What was actually decided was that the verdict of fewer than twelve men would not do, and this ap pears to rest on a quite different, but not less archaic principle, the inherent sanctity of the number twelve. Then, as not less than twelve men would suffice, so it became the fixed custom not to have more on a petit jury; why I know not, unless that it obvious ly saved trouble to take the least number that sufficed. To this day the grand jury need not be unanimous, though every present ment must be made by at least twelve men. Accordingly, the total number is twentythree, making twelve a majority. IN the American Law Review for JanuaryFebruary, Blackburn Esterline, after review ing the cases in which an Act of Congress has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, says: Thus, it will be seen, that of nineteen cases, two of which carried two acts of Congress, the judgment of only six received the concur rence of all the judges, and in two cases Congress "inadvertently" passed its limits. Furthermore, with few exceptions, all these cases were decided and the judgments passed into the archives of the country and into the jurisprudence of the world, without arousing serious public interest or comment. The decisions in Marbury v. Madison, the "Dred Scott Case," and the "Legal Tender Cases," the "Civil Rights Cases," and the "Income Tax Cases," are far the most important and practically the only ones that stirred public opinion or prolonged public discussion. In only one of these [Marbury v. Madison] did all the judges concur, and in the "Income Tax Cases," when one of the greatest ques-
