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he means is that it ought not to be. Still more common is it to hear a lawyer say that some established doctrine is "not equity, when it is not at all clear what he does mean. In either case, if his words were written down they would perplex such future ages as might take his statements seriously. Yet the Mirror is not cleared up, nor its author vindicated, by pointing out that to some extent the book may partake of the innocently fictitious character of Plato's Re public and of More's Utopia. The mere de vice of pretending that its contents, written apparently about 1289, came largely from very ancient times, is so common a mode of gaining a respectful hearing that it is com paratively innocent; but the fables carefully elaborated with fictitious and impossible names (pp. 245-251) are often of no con ceivable utility, and try the patience of even the most lenient critic; and the deliberate misstatements of law are irritating beyond forgiveness. It is true, however, that the book con tains some matter which, if carefully sifted and sparingly used, may be of value. Even if THE MIRROUR OF JUSTICES. By Andrew Home. the author were a romancer with not the With an introduction by William C. Robin slightest intent to tell either past or con son. Washington: John Byrne and Com temporary law, he was confined within the pany. 1903. (xix+337 pp.) limit of all romancers—namely, the neces It is one of the problems of legal history sity of reproducing to some extent his own to determine to what extent the Mirror is a environment. It happens that the date of fable. The book purports to give a picture this strange book is so early as to make it of English law at ancient dates—indeed, worth while to take the pains necessary for extracting here and there a grain of truth. as early as the reign of King Arthur. It For example, what is said of the wrongs— summarizes statutes elsewhere unknown. It grotesquely called perjuries—committed by tells tales so strange as to be certainly escheators (pp. 36-37), may well be used as mythical. It states as law that which never some indication of the powers contempora was deemed law by any other writer. To wards the end it gives a list of abuses of the neously exercised by those not very well un law, that is to say. of departures, chiefly derstood officials. Such dealing with this judicial, from what the author has been queer book must, however, be surrounded with precautions and suspicions. Here is no pleased to call law. He will be a skilful person who will tool for the 'prentice hand. The Mirror has had a strange history. Lystraighten out this puzzle. There is one key that goes a little way. It is found in the I ing in manuscript for at least three hundred author's declared intention to correct abuses. : and fifty years, with slight attention from the It is no uncommon thing today to hear a profession, it chanced to reach the hands of the most stupendous figure in the law. Sir lawyer, even a learned lawyer, say that some rule is "not law," when clearly enough what Edward Coke; and he accepted it as true,
Road (R. î'. Kerry Jus., Ir. Rep. 9 C. L. 4/1)." A word might be said in conclusion as to the book's relation to Law Dictionaries properly so called. For example, Ravvle's Bouvier is really an encyclopedia in which the various topics of the law are discussed, defined, and cases cited. It is at once a dic tionary, a series of short treatises and a di gest. Stroud on the contrary does not sup ply short treatises on substantive law, but rather aims to collate and enumerate the ju dicial interpretation of the various words and phrases to be found in the judgments of law courts. In short, the Stroud is a separate and dis tinct work as appears from the title-page, and it neither takes nor attempts to take the place of the Law Dictionary properly so called, such as Rawle's Bouvier. It does not supplant: it supplements. The two works are valuable, but the Stroud, in its own field, is not only unrivalled and alone, but well-nigh indispensable to members of the profession.
