tions which have previously decided it. The Massachusetts rule has certainly sufficient judicial authority behind it to entitle it to consideration on its merits in a jurisdiction unfettered by authority. It is still more clear that a Legislature called upon to deal with the question should adopt the rule which is intrinsically superior. DEAN ERNEST W. HUFFCUT, of the Cornell University College of Law, discusses, in the Уale Law Journal for March, the question of "Percolating Waters: The Rule of Reason able User." To put (he says) the concrete case, may one landowner intentionally (that is, with foreknowledge of results,) cut off a neigh boring landowner's water supply by thus intercepting, collecting or monopolizing the percolating waters that feed the neighbor's well or spring? The answer given to this question in the leading American case is that he may do so if he collects the water for his own use, but not if he collects it for the sole purpose of injuring the neighbor. If he collects it for his own use it is immaterial that he also en tertains hostility toward the neighbor. The right should not, however, be exercised from mere malice. Later American cases transfer the emphasis from the showing of "malice" to a showing of "unreasonable user" which may or may not be accompanied by malice. The answer given to this question in the leading English case is that he may do so absolutely, since he owns the soil absolutely, and all that lies therein, whether solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part water, and may dig therein and ap ply all that is there found to his own pur poses. . . . The English law is therefore clear. The landowner who by operations on his own land cuts off the percolating waters that would otherwise feed his neighbor's well or spring need make no defence, need show no justifiable purpose or occasion. His suf ficient answer is that he has an absolute right to all the percolating waters brought
or held within his own lands, and can not be called upon to explain to any one why he has chosen to collect them, or after collecting them to waste them. Some American cases are to the same effect. It is believed, however, that the prevail ing American view is that, in order to justify the cutting off of another's water supply de rived from percolating waters, it is neces sary that this should be the result of a rea sonable user of defendant's rights in his own lands. To cut off a water supply from mere malice is to cut it off without reasonable ex cuse or justification. ANOTHER contribution to the already vol uminous discussion of "The Negotiable In struments Law" is found in the current num ber of Tlic Brief, in which John Lawrence Farrell returns to the defense of the new code and to a consideration of Professor Ames' objections thereto. In closing Mr. Farrell says: While I desire not to be understood as considering the code by any means sacred and not to be defiled by the ruthless hand of criticism, I think that it may be seriously questioned whether this continually recur ring to alleged objectionable features there of, which appear to have no basis except obiter dicta or are predicated upon hypotheti cal cases or conditions created by the negli gent acts of individuals who may be parties to the instruments, is fair to the code itself or to those jurisdictions where it is already a part of the written law. It tends to Create a feeling of uncertainty and of apprehension that the courts may so construe some of the sections that injustice will result and that eventually amendments may be made. And in those States whose legislatures have not yet adopted the law it produces hostility and distrust in the minds of lawyers and bank ers, and this does not augur well for the pas sage of the law. Professor Ames apparently appreciates this, for he says that it would no doubt have been on the statute books of a greater number of States had he not vig orously urged his objections.
