The. Conflicting Opinions in the Merger Case, effectively suppress free competition between the constituent companies. While Mr. Jus tice Holmes, on the other side, bases his opinion upon the belief that all that was done in the Merger affair was "neither in re straint of trade nor monopolization. Such is the Northern Securities Company v. the United States, taken by itself, and it is indeed difficult for one to assure him self of the legal situation left by these con flicting opinions. But the case does not stand alone, for it is from the point of view of the lawyer simply the last of a series of cases in the Supreme Court upon the anti trust statute. These cases to this date are as follows: United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U. S. i; United States v. Transmission Freight Association, 166 U. S, 290; United States v. Fruit Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 585; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604; Addystone Pipe and Steel Company v. United States, 175 U. S. 211; Montague v. Lowry, and Northern Securities Company v. United States, both in the current volume. The holdings in these various cases may be recalled by a brief summary. In United . States v. E. C. Knight Company it was held that the agreement or arrangement there in volved had reference only to the manufac ture or production of sugar by those en gaged in the alleged combination, but if it had directly embraced interstate or international commerce, it would then have been covered by the Anti-Trust Act and would have been illegal; in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, that an agreement be tween certain railroad companies providing for establishing and maintaining, for their mutual protection, reasonable rates, rules and regulations in respect of freight traffic, through and local, and by which free com petition among those companies was re stricted, was, by reason of such restriction, illegal under the Anti-Trust Act; in United. States г. Joint Tariff Association, that an
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arrangement between certain railroad com panies in reference to passenger rates among the States, by which the railroads involved were not subjected to competition among themselves, was also forbidden by the act; in Hopkins v. United States, and Ander son v. United States, that the act embraced only agreements that had direct connection with interstate commerce, and that such com merce comprehended intercourse for all the purposes of trade, in any and all its forms,, including the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities between citizens of different States, and the power to regulate it embraced all the instrumentalities by which such commerce is conducted, but no more; in Addystone Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, that the act of Congress made illegal an agreement between certain private companies or corporations engaged in differ ent States in the manufacture, sale and trans portation of iron pipe, whereby competition among them was avoided by the operation of a secret pool, was covered by the AntiTrust Act; and in Montague v. Lowry, that a combination created by an agreement between certain private manufacturers and dealers in tiles, grates and mantels, in dif ferent States, whereby they controlled or sought to control the price of such articles in those States, was condemned by the act of Congress. It may now be possible to speculate as to the final course o'f events to be anticipated upon each of the four points that have been raised: upon the constitu tional question and upon the interstate com merce question, upon the interpretation of the statute and upon the application of it. What, in fine, has the Federal Government done, and what may it do do with the combi nation in restraint of trade that so threatens our industrial peace? First of all, anti-trust legislation is consti tutional: it does not deprive any persons of life, liberty and property to prohibit them
