The utmost that nations'in a state of peace have a right to demand is that they shall not be suddenly surprised or treacherously at tacked without any intimation or warning whatsoever. But "the use of a declaration does not exclude surprise'1; it only "provides that notice shall be served an infinitesimal space of time before a blow is struck. . . . The truth is that no forms give security against disloyal conduct, and that when no disloyalty occurs States always sufficiently well know when they stand on the brink of war."1 War is usually preceded by a long period of negotiation which generally, although not necessarily, terminates in an ultimatum. Moreover, with modern facilities for telegraphic communication, a complete surprise would be well-nigh impossible. The mere recall and dismissal of ambassa dors or ministers or, in other words, the breaking off of diplomatic relations, is not and ought not in itself to be regarded as equivalent to a declaration of a state of war;2 but such acts indicate that the relations be tween the States in question are very much strained or altered, and they often form a sort of transition from a state of peace to that of war. They are generally preceded by an ultimatum or final note which usually prescribes a definite time within which a fa vorable answer must be returned in order to prevent a resort to force. In such cases the ultimatum amounts to a conditional declara tion of war, i. c., conditional upon the re jection of the terms proposed or failure to accept them within the time specified. For the convenience of neutrals, as also to warn citizens or subjects of the belligerent State, it is however customary, in lieu of or • in addition to a declaration, to issue a pro1 Hall, p. 381. See also Lawrence, pp. 301-02; Woolsey (6th ed.) pp. 189-90; Walker, The Science of International Lau; p. 242: Pradier-Fodere, VI. § 2676; Rivier, II. p. 222; Funck-Bretanc et Sorel, Precis, p. 245; De Martens, Traite, III, 205. 1 Pradicr-Fodere, VI. § 2678; Rivier, 711, p. 220; Funck-Bretano et Sorel, p. 243.
clamation or manifesto which usually sets forth the causes or motives of the war, but even these are sometimes omitted. The foregoing rules or customs are so well known to students of International Law and their practice is so generally observed by modern States that it might perhaps bedeemed unnecessary to restate them here were it not for the charges of "treachery," "piracy," "bad faith," and "breach of Inter national Law" which have been made in cer tain quarters—high as well as low—against Japan in consequence of the Japanese at tack upon the Russian fleets at Chemulpo and Port Arthur on February 8th prior to the formal declaration of war by Japan against Russia on February loth. Not only have these charges been noised abroad by the apparently unanimous voice of the French as well as the Russian press, but the same opinion is said to be held by leading authorities on International Law in Paris and St. Petersburg. Most serious of all, the Czar himself is said to have made himself the mouthpiece of these charges in public as well as private utterances, and they have been presented to the whole world through the medium of the Czar's formal Manifesto of February loth and Count LamsdofPs Cir cular Note to the Powers of February 22<1.3 A brief review of the facts ought to con vince the most prejudiced or the most skeptical that the conduct of Japan in this matter was- entirely correct. It is not our intention to enter upon a discussion of the causes of this war with reference to their jus tice or injustice; for International Law as such is indifferent to causes—it does not consider the justice or injustice of a war. As far as International Law is concerned, all wars are equally just or unjust; or, more properly speaking, they are neither. Inter national Law merely takes cognizance of the 3 For these documents, see London Times (weekly ed.) for February I2th and February 26, 1904.
