neutrality on the part of China and of the lau of nations on the part of Japan. Inasmuch as numerous disputes regarding neutral rights and obligations as between neutrals and bel ligerents, as also charges and counter charges of violations of the law of nations be tween the belligerents themselves, are bound to arise in every war, and inasmuch as each party is its own judge in these matters, it is not difficult to see that we have before us a task of no small magnitude and one which contains possibilities of endless complication and controversy. Pretexts in infinite number and variety will not be wanting, especially to Russia, if she desires to avoid the natural consequences of her engagement.1 Not only must the conduct of both belligerents be closely scrutinized, but that of China must also be carefully watched. The term "neutrality," as applied to China by the Hay Note, appears to have a double meaning. In the first place it means that China is to be "neutralized" during the struggle, i. e., she is not to be permitted to become a party to the war. This might per haps be called a temporary, as opposed to the permanent neutralization of Belgium and Switzerland. It is neutralization under a sort of international guarantee of the Pow ers, although less formal and perhaps less effective than that of Belgium and Switzer land, which was the result of great inter national treaties. It may, however, prove to be a step in the direction of permanent neu tralization. If such guarantees are to prove wholly successful, the guarantors must, of course, be ready and willing to resort to other means than those of "moral suasion" or "pressure of public opinion" in case of necessity. Whether the Powers are prepared to resort to the use of force in case of such necessity in the present instance remains to 1 The Hay Note is also bound to give rise to important questions of policy and diplomacy: but this is not the place to consider them.
be seen. The "temporary neutralization1' ot China might also be compared with other modern tendencies to restrict or "localize" hostilities as much as possible in the interest of the possible or actual belligerents or of neutral commerce, c. g., the practice of pacific blockade and other forms of reprisal, although here the difference is one of kind rather than of degree. In the second place the maintenance of Chinese neutrality, as implied in the Hay Note, means that hostilities or hostile prep arations must not be carried on within the territorial limits of China proper, i. c., in those parts of China administered by Chin ese officials. This is, in a sense, merely a guarantee of a right already in existence, viz., of the undoubted right of China to re main neutral, if she so desires, and to have her territorial sovereignty respected during the struggle by both belligerents. The vio lation of this right by either belligerent would be a gross violation of International Law in itself which it might be the duty of China to resist by force of arms;. and. in case China herself were incapable of such an ef fort, such an attack might be resisted by any State which chose to champion her cause, al though such knight-errantry is rare among nations except where their national interests are involved. The right of the Powers to take such measures as may be necessary in order to prevent or to defeat an attack upon the neutrality of China is clear and un questionable. It seems to be clearly understood on all sides that Manchuria, or that portion of the Chinese Empire which is administered, in accordance with treaty stipulations, by Rus sian officials for certain purposes and is ac tually occupied by Russian troops, shall be exempt from the application of the principles of the Hay Note. This appears to be a case of what has been called "double or ambigu
