proached the striker's house, one officer tak ing a position in front and placing the others in the rear, to cut off all possible escape. The striker was given warning, and armed with a pistol ran from the rear of the house. The members of the posse called upon him to halt. He disregarded the call and continued to run. changing his course towards a tree, which the officers anticipated he intended to reach, in order to open fire upon them. They fired twice and killed him. They were indicted in the State court. After holding that liabais corpus is a proper proceeding, the court proceeds to a discus sion of the merits of the case, holding that there was an absence of malice, that the rela tor was attempting to execute the process of the court, and that the killing was in selfdefense. First Hawkins, P. C, p. 81, Sec. n, is quoted to the effect that if a person having committed a felony will not suffer himself to he arrested, but stands on his own defense, or flies so that he can not possibly be appre hended alive, he may be lawfully slain by those who pursue him. This principle, the court says, has been held to be law in this country, citing State 7-. Garrett, 60 N. C. 144, 84 Am. Dec. 359. The conclusions reached are also said to be sustained by United States in Allison 7'. United States, 160 U. S. 203216, 16 Supreme Court Reporter 252, 257, 40 L. Ed. 395, and Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 493, 17 Supreme Court Reporter 154, 156, 41 L. Ed. 528.
ble, mischievous and detrimental to good morals, and libelous upon the courts of jus tice throughout the State. The court refers particularly to the case of People v. Maccabe. 32 Pac. 28o, 18 Colo. 186, and states that the reasons which are fully set forth in that case govern the present one. In the case referred to, the attorney advertised to obtain divorces quietly which would be good everywhere. It is held that the ethics oí the legal profession forbid that an attorney shall advertise his talent or his skill as a shopkeeper advertises his wares. An attorney may properly accept a retainer for the prosecution or defense of an action for divorce when convinced that his client has a good ca,use, but for anyone to in vite or encourage such litigation is reprehen sible. An advertisement stating that divorce could he obtained quietly which would be good everywhere is against good morals, public and private. It is a false representation and a libel upon the courts of justice. Divorces cannot be legally obtained very quietly which shall be good anywhere. To say that divorces can be obtained quietly is equivalent to saying that they can be ob tained without publicity. The statutes re quire certain public proceedings, such as the filing of the complaint, the summons, service of process, either personal or by publication in a newspaper; and to indicate that such public proceedings can or will be dispensed with by the courts having jurisdiction of such cases is a libel upon the integrity of the judiciary which cannot be overlooked.
ATTORNEYS. (DISBARMENT FOR ADVERTISING.) COLORADO SUPREME COURT.
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE. (WHAT CONSTI TUTES.) MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT.
In People v. Taylor, 75 Pacific Reporter 914. the court makes absolute a rule to show cause why the defendant should not be dis barred for unprofessional conduct. The pro ceedings were brought on the relation of the Colorado Bar Association against an attor ney of that State, who advertised, through the public press and otherwise, to secure divorces. The court states that such adver tisements as were published are reprehensi
In Blanks i'. Southern Railway Company, 35 Southern Reporter 570, plaintiff sued for negligently occasioning the death of a man she claimed to have been her husband. She relied on a common law marriage made be fore the Code of 1892, requiring a formal celebration, took effect. The plaintiff's story as detailed by the court is not devoid of interest. She was the
