Decisions in France. erned as often as he changed horses. There is today what is ca'.led a constant juris prudence, much valued apparently, by pro fessors and commentators, but this "constant jurisprudence" is merely what we call the "tendency of Courts to decide in one way or another. I see only one feature in modern French . decisions which is characteristic of the pres ent times—and that is an extraordinary de velopment in the direction of deciding legal questions by—I know of no other expression better than "the rule of thumb." If anyone can tell me by what process of legal reason ing this new system of deciding legal ques tions is arrived at, I shall be in a better posi tion to define the rule of thumb." Chief -Judge (President) Magnaud, of Chateau-Thierry, is responsible for introduc ing this system in France. This really tal ented, conscientious man, but extraordinary jurist, has for a number of years been the hero of a large number of his fellow citizens, though a source of embarrassment (almost consternation) to his colleagues. His deci sions are founded on a wide knowledge ol human nature and an excellent knowledge ot psychological principles. But his decisions, from a lawyer's point of view are perplexing —to say the least. A number of his deci sions have been collected and printed, and it is the second volume of these decisions re cently published that I have now before me. "Le bon juge" of Château-Thierry, as M.
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Magnaud is called, is not alone. At Paris, there is another "bon juge"—M. Séré de Rivières, President of the 8th Correctional Chamber. To give an example of M. Magnaud's de cisions, let me cite a petition for divorce, 18 March, 1903. M. and Mme. F. made mutual petition after voluntarily living apart for ten years. Judge Magnaud granted die applica tion, stating in the judgment "that under the circumstances, adultery, of which one of the petitioners complained, was so justified by nature and sentiments of the heart that it could not be considered as the fault of one but of both in voluntarily living apart for so long." Again, December 12, 1900, M. and Mine. T. mutually demanded divorce. Judge Magnaud declined to hear evidence, as useless, and granted the petition, giving as one of his reasons "that if divorce by mutual consent was not yet the law of the land, the Court, nevertheless, should take the reciprocal petition into consideration, for two souls could not be enchained perpetually one to the other against their consent. These are only two decisions taken at hazard, but they will explain my meaning. That such a judge could keep his position is difficult to under stand, except on the grounds of the individual worth of the judge and the substantial satis faction he gives. What a dangerous power an unworthy judge might exercise, if he were to follow the "rule of thumb" principle is fearful to contemplate.
