the injury is solely to the feelings the intent cannot be presumed. The conversation which the court holds warranted the belief that the prosecutrix was willing defendant should kiss her was of a highly salacious character. The court cites Fuller v. State, 72 Southwestern Reporter 184, where it was held that the giving of a kissing sign without any attempt to commit a battery did not evidence an assault. In conclusion it is held that even had a conviction been warranted, a punishment of a fine of one thousand dollars and two years in jail was excessive, the only possible injury which the prosecutrix could have suffered being to her feelings. AUTOMOBILE STATION. (MAINTENANCE IN RESIDENCE DISTRICT—NUISANCE.) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.
In Stein v. Lyon, 87 New York Supple ment 125, it is held that the construction and maintenance of an automobile station or garage, for the entertainment of chauffeurs and their friends, in a neighborhood occupied by expensive summer residences, does not constitute a common law nuisance, the court saying that the business appeared perfectly lawful and legitimate. BANKRUPTCY. (EFFECT OF DISCHARGE—JUDG MENT FOR DAMAGES FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSA TION.) UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
In Tinker v. Colwell, 24 Supreme Court Reporter 505, a judgment for damages for criminal conversation is held not to be af fected by a discharge in bankruptcy, the de cision resting on the construction of section 17, subdivision 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that a discharge shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, "except judgments in actions for frauds or for wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another. A number of English cases are cited on the point that trespass ri et armis will lie to re cover damages for committing adultery with plaintiff's wife: and such conduct is held to be an injury both to the person of the hus band and to his property rights. Cregin v.
Brooklyn Crosstown Railroad Company, 75 N. Y. 192, 31 Am. Rep. 459, Id. 83 N. Y. 595, 38 Am. Rep. 474, in which the right to the wife's society was held not to be prop erty within the meaning of a statute provid ing for the. survival of a cause of action for her injuries, is distinguished. It is then held that the injury to the husband in committing adultery with his wife is of a malicious char acter within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, though no personal malevolence towards the husband is involved. The court says, It is also argued that, as the fraud referred to in the exception is not one which the law implies, but is a particular fraud involving moral turpitude or intentional wrongdoing, so the malice referred to is not a malice implied in law, but a positive and s-pecial malice upon which the cause of action is founded, and without proof of which the action could not be maintained. . . . The im plied fraud which the court in the above-cited cases released was of such a nature that it did not impute either bad faith or immorality to the debtor, while in a judgment founded upon a cause of action such as the one before us, the malice which is implied is of that very kind which does involve moral turpitude." Leicester v. Hoadley, 66 Kans. 172. 71 Pacific Reporter 318, is more nearly in point than any of the cases cited, it being there held that a judgment obtained by a wife against another woman for alienating her husband's affection was not released by the discharge of the judgment-debtor in bank ruptcy. CONSPIRACY. (COMMISSION 01- ADULTERY— ExISTENCF, OF CRIME—FEMALE'S MARRIAGEKNOWLEDGE OF CO-CONSPIRATOR.) IOVA SUPREME COURT.
In State v. Clemenson, 99 Northwestern Reporter 139, it is held under the Iowa Code, Sections 5059, 5093, that there is such a crime as conspiracy to commit adultery. These sections provide that ii two or more conspire to do any illegal act injurious to public morals or to commit a felony they are guilty of a conspiracy; and define a felony as a public offence punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, adultery being so pun
