land, for which an action will lie. The House of Lords held in Lemmon r. Webb, 64 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 205; L. R. (1895) App. Cas. i, that the adjacent owner may. at his pleasure, cut down the overhanging branches even without notice, and even though they have overhung for more than twenty years. But there is no suggestion that he can sue for a trespass. AN interesting article by Charles Claflin Allen, of the St. Louis Bar, on "National Control of the Pollution of Public Water ways," is the leading article in The American Laiv Revinv for May-June. Referring to State of Missouri v. State of Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 (1901), Mr. Allen says: The decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in what is popularly known as "The Chicago Drainage Canal Case hold ing that injunction would lie against pollu tion of the Mississippi river, presents an in teresting situation of the law from several points of view. Of these, the two most in teresting represents, on the one hand, the results of the case from the strictly judicial point, and on the other, the probable future results on what may be broadly termed the political side of the subject. That is to say, the case is interesting, first, because it ap plies to a cause of action between two sov ereign States the well-defined principle of law that a riparian owner is entitled to have the water of the river come to him in a pure state, and that any material impairment of the purity of the water can be the subject of injunction against the one who pollutes it Second, the case opens the door to a recogni tion of the principle that the national gov ernment has jurisdiction of the great inter state rivers in respect of the "quality" of the water for drinking purposes, and trie right to prevent the pollution of that water, as well as the uses for navigation or other com mercial purposes. First. It is interesting to note that the authorities which sustain the right of the riparian owner to have the water of the stream come to him in its natural purity, are
singularly uniform. An examination of all the cases which may be found upon this subject discloses practically no contradiction or substantial exception to this rule. . . . Whatever may be the result of the trial up on the merits ... the rule of law is laid down that one State cannot cause injury to the inhabitants of another by polluting the waters which flow from one to the other, and at any time an injunction may be obtained, upon a proper showing, from the Supreme Court of the United States. Second. The future consequences of this decision are more interesting to the country at large than the immediate results of the case are to the State of Missouri and city of St. Louis. It lias become a pivotal case, which will have the tendency to bring about new conditions along the doubtful lines in constitutional interpretation. It establishes a rule of law affecting all of the Great Lakes and interstate rivers upon which so many people in so many States depend for the water they drink. The health and welfare of the public, coupled with the fact that no State authority can control the situation, will necessarily lead to national control of the great waterways, in regard to the purity of the water, as well as in other respects in which the Federal government now asserts control over them. IN discussing the Validity of Acts Pro hibiting tke 'Docking' of Horses' Tails," the Central Lava Journal for July i says: The power of the legislature to enact such legislation being vindicated, the question arises how far can they go in providing a punishment for the offence. This question is very learnedly discussed in the recent case of Bland f. People, 76 Рас. Rep. 359, where the Supreme Court of Colorado, in uphold ing a law prohibiting the docking of horses' tails, declared that not only might the legis lature punish the person who docks a horse's tail or the person who procures the same to be docked, but may also prohibit the use or trading of unregistered docked horses. It appears that the Legislature feared that it
