tablish a similar business under the name of the wife of the covenantor, may be enjoined, at the instance of the purchaser of the busi ness, from causing- the covenantor to violate the contract by employing him, and holding him out as their active agent and superin tendent, with knowledge that the purchaser is thereby being injured, and obtaining з corresponding advantage to themselves in their business. In support of this holding the Vice Chancellor cites Stone v. GOSS, 55 Atl. 736, 63 L. R. A. 344, which he con siders as in many respects analogous. CORPORATIONS. (REDUCTION OF CAPITAL STOCK — DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS.) COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.
In Continental Securities Co. v. Northern Securities Co., 57 Atlantic Réporter, 876, the court holds that the corporation which has decided to reduce its capital stock can retain a portion of its assets. In support thereof the court cites Strong v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 94 N. Y. 426, Williams v. West ern Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 163. In this case, which involved the right of the North ern Securities Company to distribute the railroad shares held by it among its stock holders, the court also holds that in making a reduction of the capital stock, where the sur plus thus created is invested in railway shares, it is not necessary to reduce such shares to cash before the distribution. On the contrary, the directors of the corporation have the power to divide the property other than money among the shareholders. In support of this Ehle v. Chittenango Bank, 24 N. Y. 548, Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542, are cited. DAMAGES. ALONE.)
(RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA.
In Barnes v. Western Union Tel. Co., 76 Pacific Reporter, 931, the court holds that damages are recoverable for mental suffering unconnected with physical suffering. If mental suffering can be allowed for in any case, what .difference would it make whether there were physical suffering or not. Sup
pose by reason of the negligence of a de fendant, damages resulted to a plaintiff, said damages coming from two sources: ist, phy sical suffering, $100, and 2nd, mental suffer ing accompanying physical suffering, of $100, making in all $200. If the second element, to wit, the $100 allowed for mental suffering accompanying the pfiysical suffering was allowed, what differ ence would it make if the said or similar mental suffering existed by reason of a defendant's negligent act unaccompan ied by physical suffering. The reason given, in some of the cases why damages cannot be allowed for mental suffering alone is that the just estimation of such damages is so difficult. But if such mental suffering accompanied by physical suffering can and must 'be estimated, cannot and should not mental suffering unaccompanied by physical suffering be estimated and al lowed for in damages. Clearly, if so in one case, logically and reasonably it must be so in the other. The court then cites numerous authorities to the effect that damages for mental suffering are recoverable. DIVORCE. MENT.)
(WHAT CONSTITUTES CRUEL TREAT COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF TEXAS.
In Varner v. Varner, 80 Southwestern Re porter, 386, the court holds that the mere finding that a wife habitually refuses to ac cede to her husband's request for sexual in tercourse is not cruel treatment of such na ture, as to render their living together unsupportable. The court says that if it be conceded that a case might be presented in which refusal to grant sexual intercourse would constitute such cruel treatment as would authorize divorce under the Texas statute, this would, to a large degree, de pend upon the husband's physical condition as well as upon the condition of the wife. AS the mere fact that the husband made solicitations for sexual intercourse was all there was in the record indicating his physi cal condition, the court says that it may have been shown concerning him that "The way of his life Has fallen into the sear, the vellow leaf."
