absolutely follows in all cases. Thus it has
been held that the property of a non-resi
dent within the State, while strictly subject to
garnishment, as for instance in the case of a
common carrier receiving goods consigned
for transit to a place outside of the State, is
not amenable to such process. Stevenot v.
Eastern Minnesota Ry., 61 Minnesota 104,
63 Northwestern Reporter 356, 28 Lawyers'
Reports Annotated 600; Baldwin v. Great
Northern Railway Co., 81 Minnesota 247, 83
Northwestern Reporter 986, 61 Lawyers'
Reports Annotated 640, 83 American State
Reports 370. The cases cited the court re
gards as indicating that it should not give to
the Minnesota statute providing for the ac
quirement of jurisdiction by attachment such
interpretation as would, in order to secure
jurisdiction, overcome by artifice the mere
presence of property in the State, which has
practically been enforced, under exceptional
circumstances that require its presence tem
porarily to meet the necessities of com
merce. Having this limitation in view, the
court notes that under the laws of the State
of Minnesota common carriers doing busi
ness therein are required to transfer through
carload shipments to their destination with
out unloading, and that the Federal govern
ment expressly requires that the movement
of railway cars shall not be stopped or de
layed at the point where the carrier delivers
the cars to the next connecting carrier, but
that shipments shall go forward from the
originating point to their destination in the
cars in which they are first loaded. "These
well-known provisions of law are expressive
of a universal condition that exists upon all
the railway lines of this country, and without
giving them effect and permitting the rail
way carriers from other States to come into
our boundaries with goods which are shipped
here, and return without being retarded, or
so treated that the carriers must protect
themselves against litigation away from
home, that they would transfer the contents
of such cars to others in our State would be provocative of the greatest detriment to the business interest of our citizens, and be violative of the terms and- spirit of the enact ments to which we have referred. It follows that we cannot justify a construction of our attachment or garnishee statutes that would effectuate such a result, and, while it was a part of the contract between the non-resi dent corporation in this State and the con necting carriers that the freight cars should be re-loaded, and within reasonable time re turned, this custom was but a practical method of securing compensation for bring ing the car into and out of the State in the necessary effort for continuous and unbroken transit, which is essential to the purposes of traffic and interstate commerce; hence it should not be treated as property subject to attachment. This subject has been thor oughly and exhaustively considered in two recent cases, and the reasoning therein with in the lines above suggested meets our ap proval. M. C. R.R. Co. v. C. & M. L. S. R.R. Co., i Ill. App. 399-404; Wall v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Go. (W. Va.) 44 Southeastern Reporter 294. Had the car seized in this case been delayed longer than was necessary in the course of business to return it to the place from whence it came, or had it been di verted within the State to uses and purposes exceptional to its presence here under the demands of interstate commerce with the consent of the owning corporation, a differ ent proposition would be presented: but practically it was engaged in a transit into and from the State upon such reasonable conditions as ought not to impose upon it such property conditions and characteristics as should subject it to seizure in coming into and returning from the State for the purposes of giving jurisdiction to litigants here who otherwise would be compelled to contest their causes of action in the tribunals where the property had its undoubted legal situs."
