titled to be acquitted. The presumption it self does not tell the amount of evidence necessary to overcome it. In criminal cases it is accompanied by another rule, which is that the proof against the prisoner must ex clude every reasonable doubt, and in civil cases that the crime must be established by a preponderance of testimony. In each case the natural presumption of innocence may be considered as among the defendant's evi dence. But I confess myself unable to see how a presumption of law which is a mere legal rule can be "weighed," how it can con vince the understanding and make a man believe what he might otherwise disbelieve. If the presumption of law is not an arbi trary one, devoid of probative force, why is it stronger in criminal cases than in civil cases? Why is the innocence of a party pre sumed rather than the innocence of a third person? Why should the presumption be stronger "evidence" in the one case than in the other? Is the understanding convinced in the one case more than in the other? I do not wish to be understood as saying that the presumption of innocence should not be charged, even though the jury is cor rectly instructed as to the burden of proof and reasonable doubt, and though logically it adds nothing. It may tend to disabuse the jury of any prejudice against the priso ner on account of the position in which he stands, even though an instruction that the burden of proof is on the State to prove every allegation against the prisoner would be substantially the same. WRITING concerning "Reckless Automobilists," Case and Comment for September says: A supposition that automobiles can run with impunity anywhere up to the limit fixed by statute or ordinance seems to be somewhat common. Of course, it is entirely erroneous. An enactment that the speed shall not exceed a fixed maximum is by no means a license to run at that speed under all circumstances. The general principles of the law of negligence necessarily require that the speed under particular circum stances should be far less than that maxi
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mum, or indeed that the machine must be entirely stopped, if common prudence de mands it in order to avoid a threatened in jury to another person. There is a surpris ing lack of adjudications in the courts, up to the present time, in respect to the use of these machines, but the principles applicable to the subject are the same as those which govern all vehicles on highways. Outside of specific enactments, the question is simply one of negligence, and in most instances this will, of course, be a matter for the jury. It is important for the public to have the rela tive rights of automobilists and others very sharply defined by specific precedents, though there can be little dispute as to the general principles applicable. UNDER the title, "Church Law and Trust Law," the Juridical Review for September has the following interesting note on the re cent important Free 'Church of Scotland case (Bannatyne v. Lord Overtoun) : The judgment of the House of Lords in this great leading case was, in the first place, a verdict on a twofold issue of fact. It found not only that the Free Church of Scotland, at its origin in 1843, held certain articles of creed, or at least of doctrine—notably the doctrine of Church Establishment—but, sec ondly, that having originally accepted these articles, it had retained no power to revise them. These mere findings, in fact, applied to property accumulating and to views changing during sixty years, and to a Scot tish Church known to the world chiefly by its initial sacrifices for freedom, were suffi cient of themselves to convulse our- eccle siastically-minded population. But what the importance of the decision is to the law is a different question Has this decision changed our general Church Law or Trust Law? ... It may, probably, be laid down, to begin with, that while the judgment denies that the Free Church had in its constitution a right to change doctrine (or, at least, denies that such a right had been proved), it does not deny that a church may put exactly such a claim into its memorandum of association,
