of the number actually stamped, it would show a remarkable accuracy in their meth ods of calculation. Yet, with 35,000 com petitors the probabilities would be that the first prize would be won by a very much closer approximation. The court therefore comes to the conclusion that the distribu tion intended is controlled by chance within the meaning of the statute, and hence il legal. EMPLOYMENT AGENTS. «LAW С и ARCES — CONSTITUTIONALITY.)
livelihood, circumscribed and hampered by a law not applicable to his fellow men in other occupations. Such legislation is of the class discussed by ludge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, "entirely ar bitrary in its character, and restricting the rights, privileges, or legal capacities of one class of citizens "in a manner before un known to the law." For such legislation, as he very justly adds, those who claim its validity should be able to show a specific au thority therefor, "instead of calling upon others to show how and where the authority f negatived." And where, it may be asked, could the line be drawn, if the Legislature, under the guise of the exercise of its police power, should thus be permitted to encroach upon the rights of one class of citizens? Why should not the butcher and the baker, deal ing in the necessaries of life, be restricted in their right of contract and consequently in their profits, to ten, five, or one per cent.f Why should not the contractor, the mer chant, the professional man, be likewise subjected to such paternal laws, and why might not the Legislature fix the price and the value of the services of labor? The court, therefore, considers it clear that the statute contravenes the constitutional guaranty of protection in the possession of property.
LIMITING
SUPREME COURT OK CALIFORNIA. The constitutionality of a statute (St. Cal. 1903, p. 14, c. II, §4) limiting the compen sation which an employment agent may re ceive to a certain per cent, of a month's wages, was involved in Ex parte Dickey, 77 Pacific Reporter 924. It was contended that the statute was a valid exercise of the State's police power, but the court calls at tention to the fact that the due exercise of the police power is limited to the preserva tion of the public health, safety and morals; and notes that the business of an employ ment agent is not only innocent and inno cuous, but is highly beneficial as tending the more quickly to secure labor for the unem ployed. Therefore the court considers that there is nothing in the nature of the busi ness which in any way threatens or endan gers the public health, safety or morals. Nor is the purpose of the statute to regulate in these regards, or in any of them. The declared purpose and the plain effect of the statute is to limit the right of an employ ment agent in making contracts—a right free to those who follow other vocations— and arbitrarily to fix the compensation which he may receive for the services which he renders. This right of contract common to all legitimate occupations is an asset of the petitioner in his chosen occupation, and is a part of the property in the enjoyment of which he is guaranteed protection by the Constitution. By the act in question he is arbitrarily stripped of this right of contract and deprived of his property, and left, in following his vocation and in pursuit of his
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INNKEEPERS. (LIABILITY то GUESTS »OR TORTS OF SERVANTS.) UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OK APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Clancy i'. Barker, 131 Federal Reporter 161, was an action against the keepers of a hotel for injuries to a guest. A boy, who was a guest of defendants' at their hotel, wandered out of the room assigned to him and into a room wherein a bellboy of de fendants' was amusing himself by playing a harmonica while temporarily off duty. While the guest was in this room he was either accidentally or wilfully shot by the bellboy. Action was thereon brought against the innkeepers to hold them liable for the acts of their bellboy. While there are many loose statements in the books to the effect that the lia-
