condition. The Russian consul was at once requested by the Chinese authorities at Shanghai to arrange for their departure from that port within twenty-four hours. He replied that, inasmuch as the ships needed repairs, the Chinese demand was not in accordance with the laws of neutrality, and that reasonable time must be allowed for the necessary repairs. Upon demand of the Japanese consul that the Russian war ships leave Shanghai forthwith or disarm, the Chinese local authorities requested the Commissioner of Customs to report upon their condition and ascertain the period re quired for repairs. That official, having in spected the Grosovoi on August 16, reported that the destroyer's boilers and machinery needed repairs. On the other hand, it was admitted that she had come to Shanghai without reducing her speed. In the meantime the situation was changed by the receipt of telegraphic in structions from the Wai-wu-pu and the Nanking Viceroy directing that both vessels forthwith disarm or leave port, and an inti mation on the part of Japan that unless this were done, she (Japan) would send a por tion of her fleet into the port and capture these vessels, as in the case of the Ryeshitclni. In no case, it was announced, would the Japanese Government tolerate a state of affairs which permits Russian vessels to find asylum in Chinese harbors and make repairs that would enable them to resume belligerent operations. Upon the down right refusal of the Russian Consul General to agree even to discuss this proposition, the Chinese authorities again changed front and ordered that a reasonable time be al lowed for necessary repairs. But on Au gust 19, after another threat on the part of Japan, the Chinese authorities at Shanghai demanded that the destroyer Grosovoi leave that port within twenty-four hours, and that the cruiser Askold complete her repairs within forty-eight hours and afterwards de
part within twenty-four hours, or that both vessels disarm. Upon the second refusal of the Russian Consul General to discuss such a proposition, the question was re ferred to the Consular Body as a whole. This body met on August 22, but failed to accomplish anything, owing to the inflexi ble opposition of the Japanese Consul to any action affecting the rights of belliger ents. On August 24,- apparently after the Czar had ordered the disarmament of the vessels, the Chinese executed another volte face, and extended the time for the depart ure of the warships. On August 27 the Japanese Government addressed a note to the Powers informing them that, unless Russia forthwith disarm her warships at Shanghai, Japan would be forced to take whatever steps she deemed necessary to protect her interests in that quarter.1 This veiled threat seems to have had the desired effect, for the slskold and Gfosoi-oi were finally dismantled and disarmed during the first week of September, although not until after further delays and a long controversy between the Japanese, Russians and Chi nese authorities with respect to the disposal of the crews of these vessels. It was at last agreed that the crews be interned in such Chinese treaty-ports as contained Russian consulates. The last case to be considered in this con 'See New York Times for August 28, 1904. 'The Russians proposed that the precedent set in the case of the Mandjur be followed, and that the crews be sent home at the first opportunity which presented itself. The Japanese insisted, however, that the same procedure be followed as in the cases of the Russian vessels at the Ger man port Tsing-Tau, vis., that the crews be re tained on Chinese territory. It is claimed by the Japanese that the Russians violated their parole in the case of the paroled crews of the i'ariag and the Koriets who have been drafted into the service of the Baltic Fleet. See Shanghai Dis patch to the Chicago Tribune for August 29, 1904. See New York Times for October 27, 1904. for confirmation of this report. For the facts bearing on the whole controversy see especially London Times (weekly ed.) for August 19 and 26 and September 2 and 9. 1904.
