suitable scaffolding; and Pauley v. Steam Guage & Lantern Co., 131 N. Y. 90, 29 Northeastern Reporter 999; Huda ï'. Amer ican Glucose Co.. 154 N. Y. 414, 48 North eastern Reporter 897; Pitcher z: Lennon, 12 App. Div. 356, 42 New York Supplement 156: McRickard r. Flint. 114 N. Y. 222, 21 Northeastern Reporter 153; and Hover i'. Rarkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113, in all of which re covery has been permitted under a more or less similar state of facts. CONTRACT. (MADE IN CONSIDERATION OF MAR RIAGE то THIRD PARTY.) ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT.
In Austin v. Kuehn, 71, Northeastern Re porter 841, the Supreme Court of Illinois had before it for consideration a claim pre sented against a decedent's estate, which was stated as follows: "The claimant, Cath erine M. Austin, was a servant employed in the family of P.aker, and she relied and de pended greatly upon his advice and counsel. She was sought in marriage by two men. liaker volunteered to investigate the charac ter and standing of the two men for her benefit. He afterwards informed her that one of them, named Diamond, was of better character and standing and more suitable as a husband than the other. He stated and represented to her that if she would marry Diamond, and refrain from marrying the other man, he would bequeath and leave to her, by his last will and testament, the sum of $10.000, and thereupon, relying upon his promise, she entered into marriage with Diamond, and lived with him as his wife during his lifetime." This contract the court held to be one in consideration of marriage, and hence within the statute of frauds. It is of some interest, owing to the fact that the marriage, in consideration of which the promise was made, was not one to be entered into with the promisor, but with a third party, towards whom the prom isor appears to have stood in no relation whatever. CORPORATIONS. ("Our OF THE STATE"— STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.) KANSAS SUPREME COURT. A recent Kansas case, entirely dissimilar
in its facts but somewhat analogous in the principles involved with the case of Sim mons г. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 43 South eastern Reporter 780, elsewhere referred to in these notes, is that of Williams v. ¡Met ropolitan St. Ry. Co., 74 Pacific Reporter 500. Here as in the Simmon's case the de cision is grounded upon a recurrence to the primary principle of corporation law that the corporation is an entity, distinct from any of its members. Under the Kansas statute of limitations, providing that if when a cause of action accrues against a person, lie be out of the State, limitations shall not begin to run until he comes into the State, the question arises as to whether a foreign corporation carrying on business in Kansas is out of the State within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Attention is directed to the fact that a corporation must be thought of without reference to the persons who compose it and that the residence of a corporation is not determined merely by the place where it transacts business. The early Kansas case of Lane r. Bank. 6 Kan. 74, where it was held that the personal absence of the debtor from the State, even if he re tain a residence at which process against him might be served, was sufficient to take the case out of the statute is referred to and approved. It is held that the corporation must be regarded as residing in the State of its organization and hence is "out of the State" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. HABEAS CORPUS. (WRIT DIRECTED то CORPO RATION.) GEORC.IA SUPREME COURT.
As illustrating one of the limitations which inhere in the nature of corporations despite the extensions of corporate capacity and liability which have grown up to cor respond with the wider field occupied by corporations in the modern commercial structure, the case of Simmons r. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 43 Southeastern Reporter 780, is somewhat instructive. The petitioner in that case applied for a vrit of habeas cm-pits to obtain the release of her husband who had been convicted of four separate
