Notes of Recent Cases. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. (STATE SUPREME COURT — PREROGATIVES OF STATE.)
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT. An interesting question as to the original jurisdiction of the State supreme court was developed by the recent factional contest in the Republican organization in Wisconsin which gave rise to the case of State c.v rd. Cook r. Houser, Secretary of State, 100 Northwestern Reporter 964. Those per sons claiming seats in the Republican State Convention called to choose State nominees to go on the official ballot at the next gen eral election and delegates to the next Re publican National Convention organized in two different bodies, each claiming to be regular and executing the purposes of the call. The National Convention decided the contest thus created so far as it affected that body, and thereafter the State nomi nees of the convention so held to be regular commenced suit in the Supreme Court in the name of the State against the Secretary of the State for a mandatory injunction, claim ing in the complaint that unless the court interfered such nominees would be irrepa rably injured by defendant's recognizing as regular in certifying names for the official ballot the convention which had been de cided by the National Convention to be ir regular. Facts were alleged to show that the convention which the national bodv had decided was regular was, in fact, composed of a majority of those entitled to execute the purposes of the aforesaid call, and that the decision of the national body was conclusive as to the right of the matter. Defendant answered, alleging facts tending to show that the convention held by the National Convention to be irregular was composed of a majortiy of those entitled to execute the purposes of the call. It is provided by statute in Wisconsin that, when a conflict shall arise as to the use of a particular party designation in certifying names for the offi cial ballot, preference shall be given to the nominees of the convention certified by the committee which had been officially certified to be authorized to represent the party. This statute defendant alleged provided the sole remedy for determining such disputes.
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and it was averred that the tribunal therein referred to had assumed jurisdiction of the matter. Plaintiff by amendment claimed that this tribunal was disqualified because of the prejudice and indirect interest of its members, but that, nevertheless, such tri bunal had assumed to act in the matter and had decided contrary to the decision of the National Convention. Defendant admitted that the National Convention had passed upon the dispute as alleged, and after a mo tion by plaintiff's counsel for judgment as prayed for in the complaint, the defendant's counsel moved to dismiss for want of juris diction. Upon this motion it was held that the controversy shown to exist sufficiently concerned the prerogatives of the State and affected the liberties of the people, and was of so grave a character and of such public importance as to warrant the court in ex ercising its original jurisdiction. POLICE POWER. (LAW RECULATING HORSE SHOEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL.) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT APPEI.ATE DIVISION.
That even the police power, that elastic governmental prerogative, which is very nearly as all embracing as charity and has been somewhat aptly, if not absolutely, ac curately defined, as "the power to pass un constitutional laws," has its limitations is maintained by the Supreme Court of New York in People i'. Beattie, 89 New York Supplement 193. In recognition of the val uable work of the horse in the development and maintainance of civilization the New York Legislature passed an act regulating the business of horseshoeing and requiring a person practising such business to be ex amined and to obtain a certificate from a board of examiners and file the same with the county clerk where the person proposes to practise his trade. In considering the constitutionality of this statute as an exer cise of the police power, attention is called to the fact that regulations under this power must have reference to the comfort, safety and welfare of society, and it is submitted that it is difficult to see how the regulation of horseshoeing has any tendency to pro
