376 AUGUST STARCKE
between the normal and abnormal are precisely stated. But as soon as the question is put: How much abnormal performance /
must there be in order to constitute mental disease? the answer ,
is awaited in vain. When the psychiatrist has to express an opinion on this matter he manifestly acts just like a layman with a general |
education. Here and there attempts are made to answer this question on principle, but they are either too indefinite, for j|
example: (dans les psycho-nevroses) '. . . les symptomes psychiques ui
sont plus d^velopp6s que dans les nevroses simples ou partielles, mais ils y sont moins accentu^s et moins constants que dans les |
v^sanies; le ddire, notamment, n'y est qu'un Episode accidentel .;
et transitoire alors qu'il est dp regie dans les v^sanies' (Ray- mond) ;l or they appeal in the last resort to the above criticised lay criteria of failure in adaptation to society, or of unintelligibility as I
regards logic: '. . . in consequence of their coildition they are unable to guide themselves or preserve or respect the rights of others (Forel) ; '. . . in consequence of their condition other persons are i
needed for their care and protection, or they cause annoyance, |
injury and danger to other individuals or to the public' (Erlen- meyer).
It can be seen that these definitions are made according to society, the rights of which are considered unassailable in contrast to thosis of individuals. Forel's definition would include the maj- ority of normal people.
There is no * medico-technical' diagnosis of 'mental disease'. ^
Psychiatry has good grounds for the fact that it will not define the boundary sharply and according to scientific laws, otherwise it would be inevitable that phenomena which have to be account- ed as normal— like religion, superstition, amourousness, or even j the normal feeling of 'reality'— would place it in an awkward position.
Legislation makes it just as bad. In general it lays down that j,
'raving', 'mad', or 'weak-minded' persons, who through their I
illness are either robbed wholly of the use of their reason, or at least incapacitated from perceiving the results of their actions, must be put under restraint, and regarded as not or only partly
accountable or responsible for their actions: ' failure of the
capacity to act reasonably' (Switzerland, Z. G. B., par. 16.); *A state
' Nevroses et psycho-n6vroses. Trait6 international de Psychologie patho- logique (A. Marie), Alcan, Paris, 1911.
