west of Scotland (Map: Scotland, C 1). Its shores are exceedingly irregular, and its average width is about 30 miles. It connects with the Sea of the Hebrides to the south by the Little Minch, which is about 15 miles wide, and which separates the island of Skye from that of North list and the neighboring islands in the outer Hebrides.
MINCIO, mēn′chō̇. A left affluent of the River Po, Italy, which it joins near Governalo, ten miles southeast of Mantua, after a southeastern course of about 120 miles. Its source is at Pescheria, where it flows from Lake Garda. It is the ancient Mincius, and during the Austro-Italian wars was an important strategical base, several battles being fought along its banks.
MINCKWITZ, mĭṉk′vĭts, Johannes (1812-85). A German poet and classical scholar, born at Lückersdorf. He was educated at Leipzig, was appointed professor there in 1861, and in 1883 removed to Heidelberg. He first gained fame by his translations into German of Homer, Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Pindar, and Lucian. He also wrote Vorschule zum Homer (1863). In the field of German criticism, Minckwitz wrote Platen als Mensch und Dichter (1836) and Leben Platens (1838), and edited Platen's posthumous papers (1852); and he also published: Lehrbuch der deutschen Verskunst (1844); a play, Der Prinzenraub (1839); and a volume of popular poems (1847).
MINCOPIES. The native inhabitants of the Andaman Islands. They are in general of very low stature, averaging 1.49 meters, and are subbrachycephalic with an index of 82.6. They have a very low grade of civilization, living in huts called ‘chongs,’ which consist merely of a roof on four stakes, and going naked. They live by hunting and use a peculiar bow in the shape of an S, which presents a curious analogue to certain Eskimo bows and also to the bows of some Bantu tribes in East Africa. Consult Man, “Aborigines of the Andaman Islands,” in the Journal of the Anthropological Institute, vol. xi. (London, 1882); Deniker, Races of Man (ib., 1901). See Andamans.
MIND (AS. gemynd, Icel. minni, Goth. gamunds, memory, from AS. munan, Icel. muna, Goth. gamunan, to remember; ultimately connected with Lat. mens, Gk. μένος, menos, mind, Skt. man, to think). The collective term for the subject-matter of psychology (q.v.). The common-sense view of mind makes it a mind-substance, a spiritual agent, a real, simple, and unitary being, sharply opposed to material substance as ‘thought’ is opposed to ‘extension,’ yet interacting with the physical universe under some form of the causal law. This conception of mind has its root in primitive reflection upon the phenomena of sleep, dreams, trance, and death. It received philosophical treatment at the hands of the scholastic psychologists; and, in its current form, is practically a legacy from Descartes. It is doubtless kept alive by its emotional value; it satisfies human aspirations, and accords well with the natural anthropocentric notion of the world at large. It is still held by some psychologists: Ladd openly accepts it, and James, while rejecting it for his psychology, yet admits that, for his personal thinking, it appears “the line of least logical resistance.” Nevertheless, such a view of mind is wholly foreign to the spirit and to the requirements of modern psychology. In the first place, it is unsupported by psychological evidence. Had there been the same emotional temptation to reject minds as there has been to posit them, we may be sure that the arguments ordinarily urged in their favor would have received but scant attention. Secondly, the assumption of a real mind is superfluous. “The substantialist view of the soul,” says James, “is at all events needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear:” “the substantial soul explains nothing and guarantees nothing.” In so far, then, as this theory of mind is concerned, modern psychology is what Lange, the historian of materialism, named it: a psychology without a mind, a Psychologie ohne Seele. Even the few writers who still cling to the substantialist view make no use of the assumption in their actual presentation of psychological facts and laws; it is only in their concluding remarks, at the point of transition from psychology proper to metaphysics, that mind, the ‘unit being,’ is introduced. At the same time, it would be entirely erroneous to apply Lange's phrase, without qualification, to mental science. A psychology without some sort of mind would be impossible. The new psychology keeps the term mind, but defines it as the sum-total of an individual's mental experience. Just as a ‘plant’ is the organized whole of root, stem, leaves, and flowers, and not something above and behind these ‘parts,’ so is mind the organized whole of our mental processes (q.v.), the interwoven totality of thoughts, feelings, desires, volitions, etc., and not something above and behind these ‘manifestations’ of mentality.
Bibliography. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. i. (New York, 1890); Ebbinghaus, Grundzüge der Psychologie, vol. i. (Leipzig, 1897); Wundt, Outlines of Psychologie (trans., ib., 1898); Titchener, Outline of Psychology (New York, 1899); Kuelpe, Outlines of Psychology (trans., ib., 1895); id., Introduction to Philosophy (trans., ib., 1897); Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology (ib., 1889); id., Philosophy of Mind (ib., 1895). See Body and Mind; Consciousness; Elements, Conscious.
MIND, mĭnt, Gottfried (1768-1814). A Swiss painter, born at Bern. He was educated at Pestalozzi's charity school, and studied under Freudenberger. Naturally eccentric, and subject to a deformity, he studiously avoided society. He was fond of cats, his pictures of which are his most characteristic works. He was also successful in the delineation of bears. Although he died poor, some of his pictures have since been sold at very high rates, and have been frequently lithographed. Consult Wiedemann, Der Katzenraffael (2d ed., Leipzig, 1887).
MINDANAO, mē̇n′dȧ-nä′o. The second in importance and, according to the latest official estimate, the first in size of the Philippine Islands. It is the southernmost of the large islands of the archipelago, between latitude 5° 21′ and 9° 50′ N., and between longitude 121° 53′ and 126° 28′ E., about 220 miles northeast of Borneo and 270 miles north of Celebes (Map: Philippine Islands, J 12). It is bounded on the north by the channels and seas separating it from the islands of Leyte, Bohol, Cebú, and Negros, the narrowest of these channels being
