rather one of its uses, in the discrimination of attested readings. In coming to a decision on the strength of Intrinsic Evidence, a critic makes one of three affirmations respecting two variants α and β; (1) α is more probable than β; (2) α is not only more probable than β, and is not only suitable to the place, but is so exactly and perfectly suitable that it must be right; and (3) β is not only less probable than α, but so improbable absolutely that it cannot be right, so that α as the only remaining variant must be right: (2) and (3) of course include (1), and also are compatible with each other. Now in pronouncing a text corrupt, he affirms neither more nor less than in the fundamental proposition of the third instance, in which he equally finds his whole evidence exclusively in the reading condemned, and in its own relations to the context, without reference to any other variant. In both procedures the affirmation has against it all the uncertainties which we have pointed out as inherent in the exclusive use of Intrinsic Evidence: nevertheless there are places in nearly all texts where its force is so convincing that the most cautious critic cannot refuse to make the affirmation, and in every ill preserved text they abound.
92. The first, second, and fourth cases are essentially the same. The presence of more than one variant in the first and second case does not place them on a different footing from the fourth, because all but the one are by supposition subsequent to the one, and are therefore virtually out of sight when the question of accepting the most original of attested readings as the true reading arises. A critic may doubtless feel less reluctant to pronounce a reading corrupt when he sees that it gave trouble to ancient scribes; but the encouragement is due to corroboration of personal judgement, not to any kind of evidence; it comes from the ancient scribes in the character of critics, not as witnesses to a transmitted text. On the other hand the third case has an advantage over the others by combining a certain measure of Transcriptional with Intrinsic Probability. The supposition of corruption has the strength of a double foundation when it not only accounts for our finding an impossible text but supplies a common cause for two readings, the apparent independence of which would otherwise be perplexing; and this it does even in the absence of any perception as to what conjectural reading would fulfil the various conditions of the case.
