left wing, minimalists and maximalists, the cleavage being analogous to that in the social democracy. On the other hand, the unmasking of Azev wrought much harm to the party. The proofs brought forward by Burcev (1908), the admission made by Stolypin in the duma (1909), and Lopuhin's confirmation, inspired mutual mistrust among the terrorists, and made them doubt the soundness of their tactics seeing that since 1892 Azev had been able to pursue his work as provocative agent, his double game with the party and the secret police. The assassinations of Pleve and Grand Duke Sergius had been his work, and presumably he aimed at still higher game.
It was natural, in view of this disintegration and of the mistakes of the revolutionary and radical parties, that after the revolution the reaction should quickly reconstitute its forces. Enough has already been said concerning the matter. The social democrats were not slow to grasp how deplorable was the situation, and they endeavoured to reorganise themselves, whilst the other parties made similar efforts.
The Russian social democracy has changed much since the revolution of 1905, and because of it, learning much during and after the revolution. To the masses as well as to the leaders the revolution furnished occasion for practical political and revolutionary activities. It became necessary for the revolutionaries, not merely to examine the efficacy of their everyday methods, but likewise to reconsider their aims, to ask themselves to what extent the socialistic goal was attainable.
Counter-revolution and reaction deprived all the revolutionary parties of leaders. Those leaders who survived the storm languished in gaol or in administrative exile, except for the many who had taken refuge in foreign lands. The increasing hostility to the intelligentsia was largely the outcome of the perplexities of the working-class organisations thus bereft of leadership. In my account of the reaction I showed that illegal activities were forced upon the social democrats because public and legitimate political organising work was forbidden them. The restrictions imposed by the state created additional obstacles to the centralisation desired by the bolševiki, and the party broke up into amorphous and disconnected local organisations.
Nevertheless a continuous process of organisation and reorganisation went on. The leaderless mass threw up new leaders, for the most part men of working-class origin, who
