ought to be considered historically and philosophically in their general bearing on the historical evolution of Russia.
Russian works available in translation afford us some insight into the discussion. Čerevjanin's book, The Proletariat and the Russian Revolution, 1908, written from the standpoint of the men'ševiki, concludes that the economic development of all classes of the population, with the exception of the feudal ability, must lead to the formation of an opposition to the government, and must ultimately culminate in revolution. In this anti-absolutist coalition the working class unquestionably plays the leading role, but it experiences reverses and hinders the further development of the revolution because it does not understand how to work hand in hand with the liberal bourgeoisie. Čerevjanin considers the enforced concession of the eight-hour day, and all extreme demands and actions on the part of the operatives, to have been tactical errors, whose only result was to sow dissension between the workers and the liberals and thus to promote the victory of reaction. For Čerevjanin, the boycott of the duma was another characteristic example of this erroneous tactic, and the boycott was a contributory cause of the further tactical errors committed by the labour leaders.
It is, of course, quite easy after the event to point to the errors of the revolution. There need be no hesitation about admitting that not the workers alone, but the liberals also, made numerous and extensive mistakes. On the whole, hower, a study of the revolution induces the impression that the movement was better conducted than might have been anticipated in view of the lack of firmly established and well-tried organisations. In my opinion, the council of workers' deputies in St. Petersburg, despite some weakness and vacillation, deserves commendation for its general conduct of the cause; but it is plain enough that the first successes had a somewhat intoxicating effect upon the working-class leaders and that they overestimated the strength of the revolutionary forces while they underestimated the power of the government.
Judged as a whole, the revolution of 1905–1906 was advantageous to the development of Russia, was a notable warning to the government and an impressive lesson to the revolutionaries.[1]
- ↑ Cf. A. Tscherewanin, Das Proletariat und die russische Revolution, 1908. Čerevjanin's overstrained criticism, which is based upon a too literal application
