and Jutland, but did not go out of it to cover the territories of Sweden.
Let us therefore consider what is our case at present. If the king of Sweden return, and get the better, he will think himself under no obligation of having any regard to the interests of the allies; but will naturally pursue, according to his own expression, his enemy wherever he finds him. In this case, the corps of the neutrality is obliged to oppose him; and so we are engaged in a second war, before the first is ended.
If the northern confederates succeed against Sweden, how shall we be able to preserve the balance of power in the north, so essential to our trade, as well as in many other respects? what will become of that great support of the protestant interest in Germany, which is the footing that the Swedes now have in the empire? or who shall answer, that these princes, after they have settled the north to their minds, may not take a fancy to look southward, and make our peace with France according to their own schemes?
And lastly, if the king of Prussia, the elector of Hanover, and other princes whose dominions lie contiguous, are forced to draw from those armies which act against France, we must live in hourly expectation of having those troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this recall may happen in the midst of a siege, or on the eve of a battle. Is it therefore our interest to toil on in a ruinous war, for an impracticable end, till one of these cases shall happen, or get under shelter before the storm?
