as before; but only the adjective high is grammatically modified. Again, we may form three degrees with several adverbs to each, thus: Pos., very truly worthy; Comp., much more truly worthy; Sup., much the most truly worthy. There are also other adverbs, which, though not varied in themselves like much, more, most, may nevertheless have nearly the same effect upon the adjective; as, worthy, comparatively worthy, superlatively worthy. I make these remarks, because many grammarians have erroneously parsed the adverbs more and most, less and least, as parts of the adjective.
OBS. 4.--Harris, in his Hermes, or Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar, has very unceremoniously pronounced the doctrine of three degrees of comparison, to be absurd; and the author of the British Grammar, as he emotes the whole passage without offering any defence of that doctrine, seems to second the allegation. "Mr. Harris observes, that, 'There cannot well be more than two degrees; one to denote simple excess, and one to denote superlative. Were we indeed to introduce more degrees, we ought perhaps to introduce infinite, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited number, when in all subjects, susceptible of intension, the intermediate excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite degrees of more white between the first simple white and the superlative whitest; the same may be said of more great, more strong, more minute, &c. The doctrine of grammarians about three such degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is no comparison at all, and because their Superlative is a Comparative as much as their Comparative itself.' Hermes, p. 197."--Brit. Gram., p. 98. This objection is rashly urged. No comparison can be imagined without bringing together as many as two terms, and if the positive is one of these, it is a degree of comparison; though neither this nor the superlative is, for that reason, "a Comparative." Why we stop at three degrees, I have already shown: we have three forms, and only three.
OBS. 5.--"The termination ish may be accounted in some sort a degree of comparison, by which the signification is diminished below the positive, as black, blackish, or tending to blackness; salt, saltish, or having a little taste of salt:[179] they therefore admit of no comparison. This termination is seldom added but to words expressing sensible qualities, nor often to words of above one syllable, and is scarcely used in the solemn or sublime style."--Dr. Johnson's Gram. "The first [degree] denotes a slight degree of the quality, and is expressed by the termination ish; as, reddish, brownish, yellowish. This may be denominated the imperfect degree of the attribute."--Dr. Webster's Improved Gram., p. 47. I doubt the correctness of the view taken above by Johnson, and dissent entirely from Webster, about his "first degree of comparison." Of adjectives in ish we have perhaps a hundred; but nine out of ten of them are derived clearly from nouns, as, boyish, girlish; and who can prove that blackish, saltish, reddish, brownish, and yellowish, are not also from the nouns, black, salt, red, brown, and yellow? or that "a more reddish tinge,"--"a more saltish taste," are not correct phrases? There is, I am persuaded, no good reason for noticing this termination as constituting a degree of comparison. All "double comparisons" are said to be ungrammatical; but, if ish forms a degree, it is such a degree as may be compared again: as,
"And seem more learnedish than those That at a greater charge compose."--Butler.
OBS. 6.--Among the degrees of comparison, some have enumerated that of equality; as when we say, "It is as sweet as honey." Here is indeed a comparison, but it is altogether in the positive degree, and needs no other name. This again refutes Harris; who says, that in the positive there is no comparison at all. But further: it is plain, that in this degree there may be comparisons of inequality also; as, "Molasses is not so sweet as honey."--"Civility is not so slight a matter as it is commonly thought."--Art of Thinking, p. 92. Nay, such comparisons may equal any superlative. Thus it is said, I think, in the Life of Robert Hall: "Probably no human being ever before suffered so much bodily pain." What a preëminence is here! and yet the form of the adjective is only that of the positive degree. "Nothing so uncertain as general reputation."--Art of Thinking, p. 50. "Nothing so nauseous as undistinguishing civility."--Ib., p. 88. These, likewise, would be strong expressions, if they were correct English. But, to my apprehension, every such comparison of equality involves a solecism, when, as it here happens, the former term includes the latter. The word nothing is a general negative, and reputation is a particular affirmative. The comparison of equality between them, is therefore certainly improper: because nothing cannot be equal to something; and, reputation being something, and of course equal to itself, the proposition is evidently untrue. It ought to be, "Nothing is more uncertain than general reputation." This is the same as to say, "General reputation is as uncertain as any thing that can be named." Or else the former term should exempt the latter; as. "Nothing else"--or, "No other
