THE EPINOMIS;
OR,
THE PHILOSOPHER.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
An Athenian GUEST, CLINIAS a Cretan, and MEGILLUS a Lacedæmonian.
[1.] Clinias. According to our agreement, we have all of us, guest, come correctly, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, to consider the question of intellect, in what manner it is meet to go through in a discourse that, which we say belongs to the constitution of man, (and which,)[1] when it has been thought upon, causes[2] it to be in the best state with regard to itself,[2] as far as it is possible for man to possess it. For, as we assert, we have gone through all the other matters, that existed, relating to the laying down of laws. But that, which is of the greatest moment to discover and to speak of, namely, by learning what will a mortal man become wise, this we have neither spoken of nor discovered. Now then let us endeavour not to leave this behind. For we should nearly do that imperfectly, for the sake of which we have all rushed onwards, with the view of making clear (every thing)[3] from the beginning to the end.
Athenian Guest. You speak well, friend Clinias. But I
B 2
- ↑ I have translated, as if ὄ τε had dropt out before ὄταν—
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 I have adopted ποιεῖ, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of ποιεῖν: which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted it in his version, adopted in part by Taylor, "quo intellecto, humanus habitus optime se, quantum natura fert, ad prudentiam habet." From which however it is easy to see that he found in his MS. πρὸς ἑαυτὴν, of which πρὸς φρόνησιν would be the interpretation.
- ↑ I have translated, as if πάντα had dropt out before ποιήσοντες. Ficinus avoids the difficulty by thus abridging two sentences into one, "cujus aperiendi gratia hucusque profecti sumus."
