Title 3—The President
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), one of the reasons major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced, even if a government has carried out stringent narcotics control law enforcement measures. Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Included in this report are justifications for the determinations on Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B) of the FRAA.
I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela is vital to the national interests of the United States.
Afghanistan produces approximately 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium. Nearly all of this cultivation occurs in four southern and western provinces. Instability in the area allows criminal networks, insurgent groups, and illicit cultivation and drug production to thrive. While Helmand Province continues to be the largest poppy-cultivating area, the United States and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimate that cultivation in Helmand decreased between 35 and 39 percent, respectively, since 2008, to roughly 63,000 hectares.
The strategic objective of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counter Narcotics, as stated in its National Drug Control Strategy, is "to create a secure environment for a healthy society with a strong licit economy, through evidence-based policy-setting, effective coordination and full accountability to the people of Afghanistan and our government." The ongoing Good Performer Initiative, now in its sixth year, rewards provinces for successful counter-narcotics performance. In 2011, 22 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces qualified for $19.2 million in development projects as the result of their poppy reduction efforts.
Afghanistan’s gains remain fragile. Reducing illegal cultivation and trafficking are closely linked to broader economic opportunity, security, and the ability of the Afghan government to project the rule of law. International support for the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy, including from the United States, is designed to bolster the country’s drug control undertakings and is directly tied to the success of the country’s wide-ranging national objectives to improve peace, security, and economic development.
This year, the Caribbean was examined for its relative importance as a transit zone for illegal substances destined for U.S. markets. Without factoring in illegal maritime and air drug smuggling believed to be destined for Europe and beyond, approximately 5 percent of all drugs destined for the United States are estimated to pass through the majors list countries of The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. As traffickers constantly reorder their routes and methods, the United States and other donors continue to believe that countering the drug trade in the Caribbean is in our national interest, as well as that of the countries themselves. Without the rule of law, well-run institutions, and effective drug interdiction, the viability of the broad range of national and regional goals adopted by Caribbean countries is threatened.
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