Page:Treatise of Human Nature (1888).djvu/173

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OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

But 'tis certainly true, that any reasoning is always the more convincing, the more single and united it is to the eye, and the less exercise it gives to the imagination to collect all its parts, and run from them to the correlative idea, which forms the conclusion. The labour of the thought disturbs the regular progress of the sentiments, as we shall observe presently. The idea strikes not on us with such vivacity; and consequently has no such influence on the passion and imagination.

From the same principles we may account for those observations of the Cardinal de Retz, that there are many things, in which the world wishes to be deceiv'd; and that it more easily excuses a person in acting than in talking contrary to the decorum of his profession and character.. A fault in words is commonly more open and distinct than one in actions, which admit of many palliating excuses, and decide not so clearly concerning the intention and views of the actor.

Thus it appears upon the whole, that every kind of opinion or judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv'd entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, what we call the belief of the existence of any object. This force and this vivacity are most conspicuous in the memory; and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration. The next degree of these qualities is that deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect; and this too is very great, especially when the conjunction is found by experience to be perfectly constant, and when the object, which is present to us, exactly resembles those, of which we have had experience. But below this degree of evidence there are many others, which have an influence on the passions and imagination, proportion'd to that degree of force and

vivacity, which they communicate to the ideas. 'Tis by habit