and approbation of mankind. Now 'tis evident, that the very
same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of
pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity or the
desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those
particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfy'd.
But if love and esteem were not produc'd by the same
qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to
ourselves or others, this method of proceeding wou'd be very
absurd, nor cou'd men expect a correspondence in the sentiments
of every other person, with those themselves have
entertain'd. 'Tis true, few can form exact systems of the
passions, or make reflections on their general nature and
resemblances. But without such a progress in philosophy,
we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but
are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by
a kind of presensation; which tells us what will operate on
others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves. Since
then the same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause
love or hatred; all the arguments that have been employ'd
to prove, that the causes of the former passions excite a pain
or pleasure independent of the passion, will be applicable
with equal evidence to the causes of the latter.
SECTION II.
Experiments to confirm this system.
Upon duly weighing these arguments, no one will make any scruple to assent to that conclusion I draw from them, conceding the transition along related impressions and ideas, especially as 'tis a principle, in itself, so easy and natural. But that we may place this system beyond doubt both with regard to love and hatred, pride and humility, 'twill be proper to make some new experiments upon all these passions, as well as to recal a few of these observations, which I have formerly touch'd upon.
