the passion; in which case we find, that pity, instead of producing love and tenderness as usual, always gives rise to the
contrary affection. When we observe a person in misfortunes, we are affected with pity and love; but the author of
that misfortune becomes the object of our strongest hatred,
and is the more detested in proportion to the degree of our
compassion. Now for what reason shou'd the same passion
of pity produce love to the person, who suffers the misfortune,
and hatred to the person, who causes it; unless it be because
in the latter case the author bears a relation only to the
misfortune; whereas in considering the sufferer we carry our
view on every side, and wish for his prosperity, as well as are
sensible of his affliction?
I shall just observe, before I leave the present subject, that this phænomenon of the double sympathy, and its tendency to cause love, may contribute to the production of the kindness, which we naturally bear our relations and acquaintance. Custom and relation make us enter deeply into the sentiments of others; and whatever fortune we suppose to attend them, is render'd present to us by the imagination, and operates as if originally our own. We rejoice in their pleasures, and grieve for their sorrows, merely from the force of sympathy. Nothing that concerns them is indifferent to us; and as this correspondence of sentiments is the natural attendant of love, it readily produces that affection.
SECTION X.
Of respect and contempt.
There now remains only to explain the passions of respect and contempt, along with the amorous affection, in order to understand all the passions which have any mixture of love or hatred. Let us begin with respect and contempt.
In considering the qualities and circumstances of others, we may either regard them as they really are in themselves;
