which have likewise a great influence on that faculty. When
I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion
of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and
advantage to myself. When I am immediately threaten'd
with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions
rise to a great height, and produce a sensible emotion.
The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing
the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles,
and supposing the other to have no influence. Men often
act knowingly against their interest: For which reason the
view of the greatest possible good does not always influence
them. Men often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution
of their interests and designs: 'Tis not therefore the
present uneasiness alone, which determines them. In general
we may observe, that both these principles operate on the
will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails,
according to the general character or present disposition
of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the
prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; tho' we
may easily observe, there is no man so constantly possess'd
of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations
of passion and desire. From these variations of
temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning
the actions and resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety
of motives and passions.
SECTION IV.
Of the causes of the violent passions.
There is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this of the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions. 'Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a
