infamous. By this means the sentiments of honour may
take root in their tender minds, and acquire such firmness and
solidity, that they may fall little short of those principles,
which are the most essential to our natures, and the most
deeply radiated in our internal constitution.
What farther contributes to encrease their solidity, is the interest of our reputation, after the opinion, that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice, is once firmly establish'd among mankind. There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this reason, every one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live on good terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be induc'd to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of probity and honour.
I shall make only one observation before I leave this subject, viz.. that tho' I assert, that in the state of nature, or that imaginary state, which preceded society, there, be neither justice nor injustice, yet I assert not, that it was allowable, in such a state, to violate the property of others. I only maintain, that there was no such thing as property; and consequently cou'd be no such thing as justice or injustice. I shall have occasion to make a similar redaction with regard to promises, when I come to treat of them; and I hope this reflection, when duly weigh'd, will suffice to remove all odium from the foregoing opinions, with regard to justice and injustice.
SECTION III.
Of the rules, which determine property.
Tho' the establishment of the rule, conceding the stability of possession, be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human society, it can never serve to any purpose,
