Whereas to this crime they ought in justice to allow some
intermediate time, in which a tacit consent at least might be
suppos'd. To which we may add, that a man living under an
absolute government, wou'd owe it no allegiance; since,
by its very nature, it depends not on consent. But as that is
as natural and common a government as any, it must certainly
occasion some obligation; and 'tis plain from experience, that
men, who are subjected to it, do always think so. This is a
clear proof, that we do not commonly esteem our allegiance
to be deriv'd from our consent or promise; and a farther
proof is, that when our promise is upon any account expressly
engag'd, we always distinguish exactly betwixt the two obligations,
and believe the one to add more force to the other, than
in a repetition of the same promise. Where no promise is
given, a man looks not on his faith as broken in private
matters, upon account of rebellion; but keeps those two
duties of honour and allegiance perfectly distinct and separate.
As the uniting of them was thought by these philosophers
a very subtile invention, this is a convincing proof, that
'tis not a true one; since no man can either give a promise,
or be restrain'd by its sanction and obligation unknown to
himself.
SECTION IX.
Of the measures of allegiance.
Those political writers, who have had recourse to a promise, or original contract, as the source of our allegiance to government, intended to establish a principle, which is perfectly just and reasonable; tho' the reasoning, upon which they endeavour'd to establish it, was fallacious and sophistical. They wou'd prove, that our submission to government admits of exceptions, and that an egregious tyranny in the rulers is sufficient to free the subjects from all ties of allegiance. Since men enter into society, say they, and submit themselves to government, by their free and voluntary
