moral obligation is founded on the natural, and therefore
must cease where that ceases; especially where the subject is
such as makes us foresee very many occasions wherein the
natural obligation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of
general rule for the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences.'
But tho' this train of reasoning be too subtile for
the vulgar, 'tis certain, that all men have an implicit notion of
it, and are sensible, that they owe obedience to government
merely on account of the public interest; and at the same
time, that human nature is so subject to frailties and passions,
as may easily pervert this institution, and change their
governors into tyrants and public enemies. If the sense of
common interest were not our original motive to obedience,
I wou'd fain ask, what other principle is there in human
nature capable of subduing the natural ambition of men,
and forcing them to such a submission? Imitation and
custom are not sufficient. For the question still recurs, what
motive first produces those instances of submission, which
we imitate, and that train of actions, which produces the
custom? There evidently is no other principle than common
interest; and if interest first produces obedience to government,
the obligation to obedience must cease, whenever the
interest ceases, in any great degree, and in a considerable
number of instances.
SECTION X.
Of the objects of allegiance.
But tho', on some occasions, it may be justifiable, both in sound politics and morality, to resist supreme power, 'tis certain, that in the ordinary course of human affairs nothing can be more pernicious and criminal; and that besides the convulsions, which always attend revolutions, such a practice tends directly to the subversion of all government, and the causing an universal anarchy and confusion among mankind. As numerous and civiliz'd societies cannot subsist
