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A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE.

'did we not correct the momentary appearance of things and overlook our present situation,' 582; the appearance of objects to the senses requires to be continually corrected by redaction, 603, and by general rules framed by the understanding, 632.

A priori—a priori anything may be produced by anything, 247; no connexion necessary a priori, 466; a priori argument about modesty, 571.

Arguments—long, reduce proofs to probabilities by diminishing vivacity, 144; except in history where the links are of the same kind, 146.

Artifice—political, not the sole cause of the distinctions we make between vice and virtue, 500, 521, 533, 578.

Artificial—opposed to 'natural' in case of education, 117, and justice, 310 (cf. 474 f.); artificial=result of design and intention; hence all actions artificial, 475, 529; =result of intervention of thought or reflection, 484; artifice=a remedy provided by Nature in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections, 489, 496; artificial opposed to natural virtues, 475, 577, 580; though justice arises artificially yet it does so necessarily, and is not arbitrary, 483-4; the three fundamental laws of Nature, however necessary, are entirely artificial, 536; though justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural, 619.

Assent—to any opinion depends entirely on a felt strong propensity to consider anything strongly in a particular light, 265 (v. Belief, Scepticism).

Association—of ideas, by imagination guided by certain principles or qualities of ideas, viz. Resemblance, contiguity, and causation, 11 f., though these are not the infallible nor the sole causes of a union among ideas, 92; impressions associated only by resemblance, 283; association of ideas gives rise to no new impression, and so to no passion, 305, but it assists the passions by forwarding the transition between related impressions, 306; the associations between ideas and impressions assist one another, 284, as in the double relations of impressions and ideas in pride, 286; association-attraction, 289; physiological explanation of, 60; complex ideas called relations, modes, and substances, the result of association, 13; succession to property assisted by it, 513; probability or presumption the result of imperfect association, 130.

Atheism—Spinoza's, the same as the doctrine of the immateriality, indivisibility, and simplicity of a thinking substance, 240 f., 244.

Attraction—mental, compared to natural: its causes inexplicable, 13.

Barrowcit. 46.

Beauty—pleasure not only its necessary attendant, but its essence: nothing but a form which produces pleasure, 299; natural and